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STORM IN A TEACUP: THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT'S USE OF FOREIGN
LAW
Austen L. Parrish*
In this article, Professor Parrish explores the legitimacy of the
U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign law in constitutional adjudica-
tion. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has used foreign law as
persuasive authority in a number of highly contentious cases. The
backlash has been spirited, with calls for foreign law to be categori-
cally barred from constitutional adjudication, and even for justices to
be impeached if they cite to foreign sources. The condemnation of
comparative constitutionalism recently reached its high watermark, as
a barrage of scholarship decried the practice as illegitimate and a
threat to our national sovereignty. The result has been a change to the
debate's tenor. Instead of exploring how to use foreign materials in a
sophisticated and refined manner, the debate has been reduced to an
overly simplistic all-or-nothing proposition.
This article addresses the recent condemnation of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's use of foreign law as persuasive authority. After ex-
plaining how the debate has unfolded, the article critiques the recent
arguments that opponents of the use of foreign law make. The article
reveals how those arguments are misplaced, at times extreme, and in-
consistent with a long history of American jurisprudence. In particu-
lar, the article explains how comparative constitutionalism is a hall-
mark of our state court system. The article then explores how the use
of foreign law is not only sensible, but compatible with American
constitutionalism and the proper role of the judiciary. Professor Par-
rish concludes that the judiciary's use of foreign law as persuasive au-
thority is largely commendable, not illegitimate. The recent attacks
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against the use of foreign law are spurred on by rhetoric, not sub-
stance: a storm in a teacup.1
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[Other] countries are our "constitutional offspring" and how they have
dealt with problems analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we
face difficult constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn
from their children.
-Judge Guido Calabresi, United States v. Then2
INTRODUCTION
Few topics have captured the legal community's imagination and
invoked such passion as the recent debate over the use of foreign law in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court justices have pub-
licly debated the topic.3 Congress has attempted to enact sweeping laws
1. An idiom: a large fuss about an insignificant matter; making a small problem seem far
greater than it is. A "storm in a teacup" is the British or Australian equivalent of a "tempest in a tea-
pot," a phrase that scholars have used to describe the controversy over the citation of foreign law. See,
e.g., Mark Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode in the Cul-
ture Wars, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (2006) (describing the "disjuncture between the perception on one
side that something important and troubling has happened, or... may be about to happen-and the
perception on the other that there is nothing to be concerned about").
2. 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L.
519, 531-34 (2005); Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
265 (2003) [hereinafter Breyer, Keynote Address]; Justice Stephen Breyer, Remarks at the Summit of
World Bar Leaders (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/
sp11-10-01.html [hereinafter Breyer, Remarks]; Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address
Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16,
2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348 (2002) [hereinafter O'Connor, Keynote Address]; Justice
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barring judges from using foreign sources,4 while some senators have
suggested that citation to a foreign source should be an impeachable of-
fense.5 Mere mention of foreign law in an opinion triggers vitriolic re-
sponses from Justice Scalia6 and, sometimes, Justice Thomas.7 Even cir-
cuit court judges have weighed in on the debate.8 Legal scholars are not
above the fray. A spate of recent scholarly commentary has condemned
the use of foreign law.9 One professor has gone so far as to belittle jus-
Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Remarks at the National
Constitutional Center et al., Constitutional Conversation (Apr. 21, 2005), in FED. NEWS SERV.; Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks to the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnortranscript.pdf [hereinafter O'Connor, Remarks];
Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (Apr. 2, 2004), in 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305 (2004).
4. See, e.g., S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) ("Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that
judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not be
based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such
foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of the
Constitution of the United States."); see also David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 652, 656-57 nn.16 & 17 (2005) (listing multiple resolutions and legislation from 2004 and 2005
attempting to prevent justices from citing to foreign law sources).
5. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has 'Run Amok,' Adding
Congress is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at A21 (describing how Senator Coburn's chief
of staff, Michael Schwartz, has called for "mass impeachment" of federal judges); Adam Liptak &
Robin Toner, Court In Transition: The Overview; Roberts Parries Queries on Roe and End of Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at Al (describing Justice Roberts' response to Senator Coburn's sugges-
tion that Supreme Court Justices who cite to foreign judicial precedents should be subject to im-
peachment). House Representative Tom Feeney (R-Fla.) also proposed a bill, known as the Feeney
Amendment, that would expose judges to impeachment for referring to foreign law in their opinions.
Foreign Law Bill Irks Ginsburg, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2005, at 11 (discussing Justice Ginsburg's re-
marks regarding proposed impeachment bill). See generally Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How An-
thony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12,
2005, at 42, 43 (noting that Justice Kennedy's reliance on foreign sources has prompted a vicious back-
lash both on and off the Court).
6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing
the use of foreign views as "meaningless" and "[diangerous dicta"); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing as "irrelevant... the practices of the 'world commu-
nity,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people"); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (Scalia, J.) (stating that "such comparative analysis [is] inappro-
priate to the task of interpreting a constitution").
7. See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (belittling foreign death penalty values and noting that "this Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads or fashions on Americans"); see also Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (criticizing petitioners
for reliance on foreign law from India, Zimbabwe, and the European Court of Human Rights to argue
that twenty or more years on death row violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment).
8. See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in
the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893, 1900 (2005) (speech by Ninth
Circuit judge exploring issue of citing to foreign sources and cautioning against its use); Patricia M.
Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 431, 441-42 (2004) (comments by D.C. Circuit judge supporting use of foreign materials); J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
423, 429 (2004) (comments of Fourth Circuit judge criticizing use of foreign materials).
9. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING
AMERICA 18-22 (2005) (criticizing the Court's use of non-U.S. law); Roger P. Alford, In Search of a
Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005) [hereinafter Alford, In Search
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tices who dare cite to foreign opinions, remarkably suggesting that its use
is evidence of intellectual inferiority.' °
Bereft of nuance, this debate has become one of stark absolutes.
Those who condemn the practice of citing to foreign law argue that its
use should be banned in toto." They variously assert that citation to for-
eign law undermines (1) the Court's legitimacy by impermissibly expand-
ing judicial discretion and (2) our national and democratic sovereignty. 12
On the other hand, despite numerous writings extolling the virtues of
comparative constitutionalism, 3 the amount of recent scholarship that
strongly advocates the use of foreign sources, while also providing a the-
ory justifying that use, is meager. 4 Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy-
often seen as the leading proponents for citing foreign sources-respond
of a Theory] (arguing that no rigorous theory of constitutional interpretation justifies constitutional
comparativism); Robert P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise,
53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26 (2005) (arguing that comparative constitutionalism is dangerous); Kenneth
Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'Y REV., June-July 2005, at 33, 33 (criticizing
the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against For-
eign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2005) (arguing against the use of foreign and international
law and supporting deviation among constitutional systems); Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transna-
tionalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 346
(2005) (arguing that comparative constitutionalism is elitist and antidemocratic); John 0. McGinnis,
Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 308 (2006) (arguing that "foreign and interna-
tional law should not generally be used as legal authority in constitutional interpretation"); Richard A.
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 84-90 (2005) (arguing that use of foreign
law leads to "naked political judgment[s]"); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial International-
ism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185 (2005) (arguing against the use of comparative constitutionalism); see also
ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 15-25, 137 (2003) (criti-
cizing the citation of foreign law materials); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Inter-
pret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004) [hereinafter Alford, Misusing International Sources]
(arguing that international law should have a very limited role in constitutional interpretation); Mi-
chael Wells, International Norms in Constitutional Law, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 429, 436 (2004)
(suggesting that "it seems at best pointless, and at worst destructive, to give weight to decisions
reached by international tribunals that, by their very nature, cannot give due regard to differences
among cultures").
10. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 37 (arguing that "Justice Kennedy is not Justice Scalia's
intellectual peer, and it is hard to extract much of a guiding theory-in the sense of knowing when
such legal materials may be used and when they may not-from Justice Kennedy's unedifying admix-
ture of piety, vacuity, earnestness, idealism, and platitude").
11. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1763,
1765 (2004) (describing Scalia's "categorical rejection of all sources outside of the tradition" and not-
ing that "his attachment to local tradition and history involves more than just a preference for a par-
ticular approach to substantive due process; it bespeaks as well hostility towards any judicial reliance
on transnational norms of constitutional understanding"); see also Anderson, supra note 9.
12. See infra Part II.B and notes 74-90.
13. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997);
Patrick McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4 (1995) (describing
the embarrassing absence of foreign law in cases involving other nations' interests); Eric Stein, Uses,
Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 198 (1977) (describing the need for
lawmakers to study foreign legal opinions); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1232-33 (1999). See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
14. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 129-30
(2005) (describing the need for a legal theory explaining why courts are permitted to cite to non-
American sources, and the failure for academics to provide it).
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defensively, if not with bewilderment, as to why the debate ensues. 15
Rarely do they or other proponents affirmatively articulate why the ar-
guments opposing the use of foreign law are unfounded on their own
terms. And often the scholarship fails to explain how the use of foreign
law should be commended as being consistent with American constitu-
tionalism. 6
Yet it is consistent. Stripped of its rhetoric, the hostility towards cit-
ing foreign decisions in any context seems misplaced. Those who oppose
the use of foreign law confuse the question of validity with the question
of what weight to afford that law. The critics also ignore a history of
practice in which foreign legal materials have been used in constitutional
analysis. 7 Indeed, the practice is one our state courts have long em-
braced when interpreting their own, unique state constitutions, a point
that until now has been downplayed. Lurking under the surface of ar-
guments made by those who oppose the use of foreign sources appears to
be the hubris of American exceptionalism. More fundamentally, the ar-
guments often reflect particular modes of constitutional interpretation-
textualism and originalism -that, despite recent attempts to resuscitate,
the legal mainstream long ago rejected or discounted, at least in their ex-
treme forms. 8 A need therefore remains to explain not only why the use
of foreign law is not offensive, but why its use is consistent with Ameri-
can constitutionalism and the proper role of the judiciary. This article
attempts to do exactly that.
This is not an academic exercise: explaining why the U.S. Supreme
Court's use of foreign law is legitimate, while debunking arguments that
categorically reject its use, is important. The spirited backlash against
the judiciary for citing to foreign materials as persuasive authority
threatens to have a chilling effect. 9 Instead of exploring how to utilize
foreign materials in a refined way, the debate has been debased to an all-
15. Anderson, supra note 9, at 34,39.
16. Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 9, at 639 (explaining that proponents of the prac-
tice of citing to foreign or international materials "rarely offer a firm theoretical justification for the
practice"); Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of Selecting the
Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 301, 309 (2004) (noting that "[w]hile most authors fo-
cus on classifications of comparative law, few actually address its legitimacy"); Waldron, supra note 14,
at 129 (noting that "no one on the Court [has] bothered to articulate a general theory of the citation
and authority of foreign law").
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. See infra Part II.C. Almost all agree that the text and the intent of the Framers is the starting
point of any constitutional analysis. The issue is what to do when the text and intent are not easily
discernable.
19. The last time Justice Scalia vigorously attacked a citation practice-the use of legislative his-
tory in statutory interpretation-he had a significant impact in reducing the practice. See Michael H.
Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's
Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999) (concluding that Justice Scalia's acerbic criticism of the
reliance on legislative history led to an overall decline in the use of that interpretive tool). For an ex-
planation of why the Court might start using foreign materials silently, even when the use is legitimate,
see Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 1107, 1125-27
(1995) (arguing that an "appearance factor" influences decision making).
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or-nothing proposition, with extreme and fringe positions obtaining a de-
gree of superficial credibility. The result is problematic, and its impact
real. Lessons that could be learned from other countries are missed.
Moreover, the Court's failure to engage more meaningfully with foreign
law divorces the Court from an ongoing transnational dialogue that is
developing and shaping international norms-norms that, one day, may
exert some control domestically.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the current de-
bate and how it has unfolded in the last few years. Part II explores the
validity of arguments championed by those who oppose citation to for-
eign law sources and explains why those arguments are misplaced. Con-
trary to the positions staked in the flood of critical articles published in
2005, the use of foreign law is hardly an offensive practice. Part III ex-
plains why citation to foreign law is consistent with American constitu-
tionalism and explores some pragmatic reasons for why the U.S. Su-
preme Court's use of foreign law is sensible. The article concludes by
suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court should continue cautiously to
use foreign law as persuasive authority. Engaging in transnational con-
stitutional dialogue is a commendable goal, not an illegitimate one.
I. BACKGROUND
The citation to foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions is not a
new phenomenon, but the debate over its use has only recently become
bitter. The debate has proceeded on two fronts. One front is in the po-
litical arena, where elected officials and pundits have attacked vigorously
the judiciary's use of foreign law.20 The other front is in the nation's law
schools. Last year, a slew of academic scholarship condemned the
Court's use of foreign law as persuasive authority.21
A. Use of Foreign Law: A Recent History
The debate reached a highpoint after the U.S. Supreme Court cited
to foreign law in four well-publicized, controversial decisions in "hotly
contested areas of constitutional law" involving capital punishment, gay
rights, and affirmative action.2 First, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court
held that executing mentally disabled persons violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 3 In so
20. See, e.g., Hulse & Kirkpatrick, supra note 5; Legal Matters: The Insidious Wiles of Foreign
Influence, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at 25.
21. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 9.
22. Law, supra note 4, at 653.
23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). This is not to say that the Supreme Court
had not cited to foreign law many times in the past. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
734 (1997) (referring to the Dutch experience with physician-assisted suicide to determine whether
recognizing a right to physician-assisted suicide would encourage other forms of euthanasia). See gen-
erally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
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doing, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, referred to the "world
community" and its "overwhelming[]" disapproval of imposing the death
penalty on mentally disabled offenders.24
Second, on the heels of Atkins, came Grutter v. Bollinger.2 1 In Grut-
ter, the Court found foreign law relevant when it upheld the use of af-
firmative action in university admissions. During the oral argument for
Gratz v. Bollinger, decided the same day as Grutter, Justice Ginsburg
asked the solicitor general:
We're part of a world, and this problem is a global problem. Other
countries operating under the same equality norm have confronted
it. Our. neighbor to the north, Canada, has; the European Union,
South Africa, and they have all approved this kind of, they call it
positive discrimination. ... [T]hey have rejected what you recited
as the ills that follow from this. Should we shut that from our view
at all or should we consider what judges in other places have said on
this subject? 26
In her concurrence in the Grutter case, Justice Ginsburg-joined by Jus-
tice Breyer-explained that "[t]he Court's observation that race-
conscious programs 'must have a logical end point,' accords with the in-
ternational understanding of the office of affirmative action," and cited
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination.27
Third was Lawrence v. Texas.28 In June 2003, the Court struck down
Texas legislation that criminalized sodomy, reversing its decision in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick.29 In reaching this result, Justice Kennedy relied not only
on a 1957 British Report, but also decisions by the European Court of
Human Rights. 3' As Justice Kennedy noted: "[A]lmost five years before
Bowers was decided, the European Court of Human Rights considered a
case with parallels to Bowers and to today's case. ... The [European]
court held that the laws prescribing conduct were invalid under the
European Convention on Human Rights., 31
Lastly, and most recently, came Roper v. Simmons.32 In Roper, Jus-
tice Kennedy, again writing for the Court, struck down state laws that
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's long practice of citing to transnational law in consti-
tutional cases). The debate, however, did not become particularly heated until after Atkins.
24. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
25. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For a thoughtful first amendment analysis of Grutter, see Paul Horwitz,
Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005).
26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
27. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-44 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
28. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29. Id. at 578.
30. Id. at 573 (discussing the European Court of Human Rights decision in Dudgeon v. UK., 4
Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 164-65 (1981)).
31. Id.
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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permitted the execution of juvenile offenders.33 In so holding, the Court
acknowledged that other countries and international conventions have
banned the execution of juvenile murderers.34 Justice Kennedy cited to
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Inter-
national Convention on Civil and Political Rights.3 In her dissent, Jus-
tice O'Connor similarly acknowledged that foreign sources of law were
relevant to the issues before the Court.36 Commentators concluded that
Roper's reliance on foreign sources "portend[ed] a sea change in the
Court's doctrine.
37
Not only have many justices used foreign law in their opinions, they
also have been keen to keep the issue alive and at the "forefront of schol-
arly debate. ' 38 In January 2005, Justices Scalia and Breyer met at Ameri-
can University to publicly debate "The Relevance of Foreign Law for
Constitutional Adjudication. ' 39 A year before, at the 2004 American So-
ciety of International Law's annual meeting, Justice Scalia spoke out
against using foreign authorities, except for old English authorities shed-
ding light on the Framers' intent.n' He spoke out again in February
2006.41 Other justices, in contrast, have written scholarship championing
the practice of citing to foreign sources42 or have advocated its use in
33. Id. at 578.
34. Id. at 575-76. A significant number of amicus briefs from human rights organizations and
U.S. diplomats argued that executing juveniles contradicted international legal norms. Id. at 576 (cit-
ing Brief for Respondent 48; Brief for European Union et al. as Amici Curiae 12-13; Brief for Presi-
dent James Earl Carter, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae 9; Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton
Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae 7; Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and
Wales et al. as Amici Curiae 13-14); see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae former U.S. Diplomats Morton
Abramowitz et al. in Support of Respondent, Roper ("Amici believe that persisting in [the] aberrant
practice of executing juveniles will further the diplomatic isolation of the United States and inevitably
harm foreign policy objectives.").
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
36. Id. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. See generally Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 23, at 748-51; Comment, The Debate over
Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REv. 103, 103-04 (2005) (explaining that "the Roper
decision has prompted a national debate over the propriety of citing foreign and international law in
domestic constitutional cases"); cf Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider
Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1283 (2004) ("It would be an understatement in
the extreme to call the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas revolutionary.... Its holding
aside, Lawrence may have added a spark to a quieter revolution-a revolution in constitutional inter-
pretation that has been stirring, largely unnoticed, for years. The revolution of which I speak.., is the
Court's recent, and unexplained, embrace of comparative and international law norms as aids to do-
mestic constitutional interpretation.").
38. Melissa A. Waters, Justice Scalia on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation:
Unidirectional Monologue or Co-Constitutive Dialogue, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 151 (2004).
In fact, "[a]ll nine Justices have addressed the matter in recent years." Alford, In Search of a Theory,
supra note 9, at 640.
39. See Dorsen, supra note 3.
40. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 305-06.
41. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, Subject: Outsourcing
American Law (Feb. 21, 2006), in FED. NEWS SERV. (arguing that "foreign materials can never be rele-
vant to constitutional adjudication").
42. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An Interna-
tional Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 253 (1999) (explaining the relevance of interna-
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speeches.43 In a 2004 speech at Georgetown Law School, Justice
O'Connor made clear her support for citing to foreign law sources." So
too did the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist -over fifteen years ago:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercis-
ing the power of judicial review had no precedents to look to save
their own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of author-
ity.... But now that the constitutional law is solidly grounded in so
many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin look-
ing to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
deliberative process. 5
The justices' remarks have met with fierce criticism, and even death
threats.46
Congress's response to the Court's use of foreign law has been un-
abashedly hostile. In March 2004, House Republicans introduced a reso-
lution prohibiting the use of foreign authorities except in special circum-
stances where the foreign law "informs an understanding of the original
meaning of the laws of the United States. '47  In 2005, the Senate intro-
duced a similar measure.4' Although neither resolution passed, individ-
ual members of Congress made spirited attacks against the practice.49 In
tional law to constitutional interpretation of affirmative action); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Be-
yond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO
L. REV. 1-10 (2003) (explaining the relevance of studying international law); Sandra Day O'Connor,
Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT'L
JUD. OBSERVOR, June 1997, at 2 (predicting increased reference to foreign constitutional courts that
have struggled with similar constitutional questions).
43. See, e.g., Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 3; Breyer, Remarks, supra note 3; Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Human Kind: The Value of a Compara-
tive Perspective to Constitutional Adjudication, Address Before the Constitutional Court of South
Africa (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.us.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-02-07b-06.
html; O'Connor, Keynote Address, supra note 3; O'Connor, Scalia & Breyer, supra note 3; O'Connor,
Remarks, supra note 3.
44. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the American Law Institute 2002 Annual Meet-
ing (May 15, 2002) (opining that "while ultimately we must bear responsibility for interpreting our
own laws, there is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the same
difficult issues that we face here").
45. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); see also William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING
THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2002) ("I am simply repeating now what I've said previously: it's time the U.S. courts began looking to
the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process."); cf Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732, 734 (1997) (Rehnquist in a majority opinion quoting to "the practice
of euthanasia in the Netherlands").
46. Ginsburg, supra note 43; see also In Brief Ginsburg, O'Connor Subjects of Death Threat,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 3; Tony Mauro, Ginsburg Discloses Threats on Her Life: In Speeches, Jus-
tice Says She and Sandra Day O'Connor Were Targeted Because of Use of Foreign Law in Cases, LE-
GAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at 8.
47. Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
48. S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).
49. See, e.g., Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law:
Hearing on H. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary's Sub-
comm. on the Constitution) (criticizing the "alarming new trend" of "judges reaching beyond even
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Chief Justice Roberts's confirmation hearings, one Senator suggested
that citation to foreign sources should constitute an impeachable of-
fense.5" Senators reaffirmed this sentiment in Justice Alito's hearings.5
The national media has actively chronicled the debate, with newspapers
routinely discussing the practice, and politicians and pundits weighing in
with their opinions.52 At times, the criticism has had a xenophobic tone
to it, playing on "exaggerated fears: fear of foreign domination, fear of
judicial activism, fear of the unknown."53
their own imagination to the decisions of. foreign institutions to justify their decisions"); 151 Cong.
Rec. H 3N5 (daily ed., May 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe) ("[Patriots] spilled their
blood ... to sever ties with England forever. ... Now, justices in this land of America ... use British
court decisions.., in interpreting our Constitution. What the British could not accomplish by force,
our Supreme Court has surrendered to them voluntarily."); F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Remarks Be-
fore the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary, 87
JUDICATURE 202, 260 (2004) (arguing that "America's sovereignty may be imperiled by a jurispru-
dence predicated upon laws and judicial decisions unfound in our Constitution and unincorporated by
the Congress").
50. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 199-200 (2005) (Sen. John
Kyl's questioning of John Roberts), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/
sh109-158/browse.html; see also Liptak & Toner, supra note 5 (describing Justice Roberts' response to
Senator Coburn's suggestion that Supreme Court Justices who cite to foreign judicial precedents
should be subject to impeachment). House Representative Tom Feeney (R-Fla.) also proposed a bill,
known as the Feeney Amendment, that would expose judges to impeachment for referring to foreign
law in their opinions. See Foreign Law Bill Irks Ginsburg, supra note 5 (discussing Justice Ginsburg's
remarks regarding the proposed impeachment bill).
51. Alito Fails to Convince Democrats on Abortion, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at 13 (noting that
Justice Alito opposed citing to foreign law, but did not endorse a suggestion that justices should be
impeached for doing so); see also Felix G. Rohatyn, Dead to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at
A23 (describing Justice Alito's views on the use of foreign law as "narrow and parochial"); David
Stout, Nominee Would Ignore Foreign Laws, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 12, 2006, at 5, available at 2006
WLNR 638855 (noting that Justice Alito said in response to questions from Senator Coburn that "I
don't think it's appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in interpreting the provisions of our Consti-
tution.... I think the Framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted
by taking a poll of the countries of the world").
52. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Op. Ed., The View over the Fence: The U.S. Supreme Court, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 20, 2005, at 6 (describing the debate over citing to foreign law sources);
James G. Lakely, Roberts Criticizes Foreign Law Used as Precedent: Says Practice Circumvents Judges'
Accountability to the People, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Sept. 14, 2005, at All (quoting Ed Whelan, Presi-
dent of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, as saying, "There is no legitimate basis for the Supreme
Court to rely on contemporary foreign laws or decisions in determining the meaning of provisions of
the Constitution"); Abdon M. Pallasch, Justices Shouldn't Cite Foreign Laws, U.S. Attorney General
Tells Students, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at 24 (noting that Alberto Gonzalez warned members
of the U.S. Supreme Court Wednesday not to cite foreign law in their opinions, and doing so was
"meddling in U.S. foreign relations"); Kathleen Sullivan, Battle for Courts: What's at Stake, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, May 29, 2005, at 1 (describing the recent attack on the judiciary and noting that
"conservative lawyer and commentator Phyllis Schlafly called for a 'law declaring it an impeachable
offense for justices to rely on foreign law in rendering constitutional decisions"'); Hope Yen, Justices
Debate Foreign Law, BRADENTON HERALD, Apr. 22, 2005, at A4 (describing panel discussion and
views of Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Scalia on the use of foreign law materials); see also Steve
Grady, Letter to the Editor, Judicial Rulings That Cite Foreign Law Alienate U.S. Citizens, USA
TODAY, June 23, 2005, at 12A; The Insidious Wiles of Foreign Influence, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at
25-26; Charles Lane, The Court is Open for Discussion: AU Students Get Rare Look at Justices' Legal
Sparring, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,2005, at Al.
53. Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82, 82 (2004) (discussing the related issue of whether international law is relevant to constitu-
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Academics have not shied away from the controversy. In the late
1990s, several well-regarded scholars promoted the benefits of compara-
tive constitutionalism and the need for a transnational judicial dialogue. 4
A significant amount of scholarship followed both the Lawrence and
Roper decisions:55 "international lawyers and comparativists hailed the
move [towards discussing foreign materials] as a major victory in their
ongoing battle to convince the Court to pay more attention to decisions
of foreign courts."56 More recently, however, a backlash has ensued."
Some commentators have begun to decry aggressively the use of foreign
materials,58 and several colloquiums and symposiums have been held on
the topic.59 In the blogosphere, the debate is heated, if not mean spir-
ited.' Citation to foreign law sources has become synonymous with judi-
cial activism, sometimes eliciting shrill claims of an out-of-control Court.
tional interpretation in the United States). At times, the criticism has reached the level of absurdity.
See, e.g., Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at
A3 (quoting author Edwin Vieira as calling for Justice Kennedy's impeachment because his citation to
foreign law "upholds Marxist, Leninist, satanic principles" and Michael P. Farris, Chairman of the
Home School Legal Defense Association, who "said Kennedy 'should be the poster boy for impeach-
ment' for citing international norms in his opinions"); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., United States:
Lawrence v. Texas and the Imperative of Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 555, 558
(2004) (describing the "whiff of xenophobia" in Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence).
54. See supra note 13. See generally Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 491-92
(2005) (describing recent literature).
55. Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparison: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 109 (2005) (listing scholarship); see also Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional
Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003) (noting that prior to Lawrence "no recent Supreme Court
decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or para-constitutional law to support a proposition that was
material to the majority's analysis").
56. Waters, supra note 54, at 491.
57. Toobin, supra note 5, at 43-44,50-51 (describing the backlash against the Court and the cita-
tion to foreign law).
58. See supra note 9; see also Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (2004) (criticizing the use of foreign materi-
als); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Constitutional Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of
Foreign Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269, 294 (2003) (focusing on the Argentinean constitutional experi-
ence and arguing that "borrowing and dialogic uses of foreign constitutional norms by courts are prob-
lematic"); Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic
Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193 (2003) (urging restraint in using comparative constitutional
analysis); Robert H. Bork, Whose Constitution Is It, Anyway?, NAT'L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, at 37 (charac-
terizing the citation to foreign sources as an "absurd turn in our jurisprudence" reflecting judicial ar-
rogance); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug.
2004, at 3.
59. In September 2003, the Texas International Law Journal sponsored a symposium on "Global-
ization and the Judiciary." In February 2004, the Texas Law Review held a symposium on "Compara-
tive Avenues in Constitutional Law." Other schools have done the same. See, e.g., Symposium, Inter-
national Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term: Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers Between
National, Foreign, and International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. (2004); Symposium, "Out-
sourcing Authority?" Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic Jurisprudence, 69 ALB. L. REV.
645 (2006); Symposium, The Third Symposium on Globalization and the Judiciary, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J.
197(2005).
60. See, e.g., Posting of Michael Kelly to ACS Blog, http://www.acsblog.org/international-affairs-
1396-kelly-responds-to-kerr-on-international-law-in-us-courts.html (May 27, 2005, 12:54 PM); Posting
of Orin Kerr to the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_04_10-2005-04_
16.shtml#1113424503 (Apr. 13, 2005,4:35 PM).
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The debate's strident nature has puzzled foreign scholars in other
countries. Other nations' courts often cite to foreign materials.6 The
Supreme Court of Canada, for example, cited to at least one British case
in about 45% of their decisions between 1984 and 1995, and had at least
one citation to a U.S. case in nearly 30% of their decisions.62 Even as a
"uniquely Canadian body of law" has grown, the Canadian Supreme
Court's use of foreign law has "increased in frequency and diversity."63
Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court frequently cites to for-
eign materials.' In fact, the "South African Constitution explicitly re-
quires that international law be taken into account when interpreting
constitutional rights and specifically authorizes its courts to consider for-
eign law.... "65
South Africa and Canada are not unique. In virtually all foreign na-
tions, courts "borrow[] from, respond[] to, or otherwise interact[] sub-
stantially with external sources of law, including foreign sources that do
not fit directly into the home system's formal hierarchy of positive
norms."'  Comparative constitutionalism has become prominent world-
61. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
62. C.L. Ostberg et al., Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: Explaining the Citations of
Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada, 34 CANADIAN J. POL. Sci. 377, 386-87 (2001).
See generally G6rard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L.
REV. 211, 212 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353, 353-54 (2004) (describing the use of foreign materials in Ca-
nadian courts); Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations 1945-1994:
A Statistical Overview, 8 SUP. CT. L. REV. 527, 533 (1997).
63. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409,411-
17 (2003) (comparing approaches taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Canadian Supreme Court
to citing to foreign sources and noting that Canadian courts cite to American, Australian, European
Community, New Zealand, and South African law).
64. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 820 (1999); see also D. M. Davis, Constitutional Borrow-
ing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local History in the Reconstitution of Comparative Influence:
The South African Experience, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 181, 191-95 (2003) (describing the extent to which
South African constitutional law is shaped by comparative precedent); Levinson, supra note 62, at 354
(noting the South African practice of looking at "decisions of courts around the world for the insight
that they cast on the solution of common problems").
65. Jackson, supra note 55, at 113.
66. Paulo G. Carozza, "My Friend is a Stranger": The Death Penalty and the Global lus Com-
mune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (2003); see also Guido Alpa, Foreign Law in Inter-
national Legal Practice: An Italian Perspective, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 495, 496 (2001) (describing how "the
use of foreign law in Italy is the subject of a very rich history"); Bruce Carolan, The Search for Coher-
ence in the Use of Foreign Court Judgments by the Supreme Court of Ireland, 12 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 123, 124 (2004) (describing the Irish Supreme Court's willingness to employ decisions of for-
eign courts in interpreting the Irish Constitution); Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional Borrowing and Politi-
cal Theory, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 224, 226 (2003) (describing the use of comparative materials in post-
war Japan); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 505-06 (2000) (noting the
increase in citation to foreign law in British courts and the use of comparative materials in Israel, Aus-
tralia, South Africa, Canada, India, New Zealand, Zimbabwe, and Ireland); Wiktor Osiatynski, Para-
doxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 244, 244-45 (2003) (describing use of compara-
tive precedent in Eastern and Central Europe, and Poland in particular); Matthew S. Raalf, A Sheep in
Wolf's Clothing: Why the Debate Surrounding Comparative Constitutional Law is Spectacularly Ordi-
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wide.67 Compared to other western democracies, the American practice
has become increasingly isolated as an extreme version of provincial-
ism.68
B. The Scholarly Debate
With this background, it is useful to understand how the scholarly
debate has unfolded. First, what is the debate not about? No one argues
that foreign institutions should control constitutional meaning. Jurists
and scholars do not suggest-indeed would be foolish to suggest-that
* foreign rulings are legally binding on American courts;69 or
0 courts may impose foreign perspectives upon Americans
through constitutional interpretation.7"
Nor is this particular debate about whether international law and norms
can become authoritative in U.S. constitutional adjudication.71 Rather,
nary, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1239, 1242-43 (2004) (describing the extensive use of comparative materi-
als in foreign courts).
67. See Developments in Law-International Criminal Law: VI. The International Judicial Dia-
logue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2059-63
(2001) [hereinafter International Judicial Dialogue] (noting that many countries engage without reser-
vation in comparative constitutional analysis and that "the courts seem to find it not only appropriate,
but even natural, to examine (and perhaps ultimately to rely on) the interpretations that their foreign
and supranational counterparts have given to similar constitutional provisions); see also Ackerman,
supra note 13, at 772-73 (describing the global transformation towards constitutionalism); Jacobsohn,
supra note 11, at 1767-68 (describing how courts in Israel, India, and Ireland use foreign materials in
constitutional adjudication); Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The
Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296,
304-08 (2003) (describing the influence of the U.S. Constitution abroad).
68. Ackerman, supra note 13, at 772-73.
69. Levinson, supra note 62, at 353 ("One obviously need not believe that there is an obligation
to be bound by that foreign experience-indeed, I know of no one who makes such a foolish argu-
ment ...."); Wells, supra note 9, at 429 ("Since nobody asserts that these rules are legally binding on
American courts..."); Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 3, at 266 ("But comparative use of for-
eign constitutional decisions will not lead us blindly to follow the foreign court. As I have said be-
fore-'we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations ....'). This is not en-
tirely true for international norms, which some scholars occasionally argue should be presumptively
controlling in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic
Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655,
689 (1983) (arguing that international norms should be used as a rule of decision).
70. Levinson, supra note 62, at 353; see also International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 67, at
2059 (noting that foreign courts who engage in comparative constitutionalism are not "willing to adopt
an outside legal norm unless it accord[s] with domestic legal and political traditions.... [T]he interpre-
tive process of these courts indicates that they do not view domestic law as subordinate to interna-
tional law").
71. Whether international law should be cited to or relied upon is a related, but different debate.
See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Curtis Bradley, Customary International Law and Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing against the incorpora-
tion of international law into the U.S. legal system); Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human
Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 327, 335 (2000) (arguing against deference
to international norms); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824, 1835 (1998) (asserting that federal courts retain the power to incorporate customary inter-
national law into federal common law); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 371, 376
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the debate is whether the U.S. Supreme Court must categorically ignore
foreign law-the opinions of courts in foreign nations-in all constitu-
tional cases.72 Are these authorities, as some imply, "affirmatively barred
from U.S. constitutional adjudication? 73
Opponents of the use of foreign law sources answer yes, and base
their opposition on two principal arguments. First, some scholars argue
that citing to foreign law undermines judicial legitimacy by impermissibly
expanding judicial discretion.74 Justice Scalia, for example, asserts that
using foreign sources threatens the Court's legitimacy by implicating per-
sonal value judgments as to which foreign law to cite.75 His argument is
an extension of originalism: the judiciary is an undemocratic institution
within a political system whose legitimacy is derived from the consent of
the governed. 76 To overcome a threat of illegitimacy, the argument goes,
the Court must adhere closely to the text and the original intent of those
upon whose authority the legitimacy of the text rests.7 7  "A court that
moves beyond the formalism of the text and the boundaries of original
history has exited the objective domain of law and has entered the sub-
jective enterprise of politics. 78
Others have made the same point in slightly different ways. Ken-
neth Anderson argues that citing to foreign law invites "judges to 'troll
deeply... in the world's corpus juris' to reach a politically preferred out-
come, '79 a practice which "swings wide the door for the exercise of
judges' purely private sensibilities as public justices... [which is] uncon-
strained and unconstrainable."8  In his recent confirmation hearings,
(1997) (arguing that customary international law is "presumptively incorporated into the U.S. domes-
tic legal system and given effect as rules of federal law").
72. Uniformly, all agree that foreign and international law is relevant in the "interpretation of
statutes, conventions, international agreements, and so on." Anderson, supra note 9, at 34 n.2. Schol-
ars disagree about the use of foreign law in constitutional cases.
73. Id. at 34.
74. Id. at 45-46.
75. Dorsen, supra note 3, at 531 (describing the use of foreign law as lending itself to manipula-
tion); see also Scalia, supra note 41 (arguing that use of foreign materials "vastly increases the scope of
[judicial] discretion").
76. See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (discussing the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty); Law, supra note 4, at 681 (explaining that "[t]he countermajoritarian dilemma is considered a
dilemma because whenever constitutional courts dare to do more than validate existing consensus they
are subject to a supposedly withering retort: 'we did not elect you, so why should we listen to you."').
77. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1147, 1154 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Anderson, supra note 9, at 44-46 (quoting Judge Posner).
80. Id. at 42. As Anderson argues:
It is a confirmation of Justice Scalia's view that the leading opinions featuring comparative consti-
tutionalism-those of Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy-are animated by exactly the judicial
philosophies which, with respect to the rhetoric of judging, are the least constrained. Either the
citation of foreign and international legal materials will come to nothing-it will mean nothing-
or else, far more likely, it will open up whole new areas of rhetorical possibility. How can it be
otherwise? There is nothing internal here, whether in principle or in practice, that acts to con-
strain.
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Chief Justice Roberts suggested that relying on foreign precedent allows
a judge "to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, [and] cloak
them with the authority of precedent."81 He explained it this way:
[RIelying on foreign precedent doesn't confine judges. It doesn't
limit their discretion the way relying on domestic precedent
does.... Foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't
find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of So-
malia or Japan or Indonesia, or wherever. As somebody said in an-
other context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking out
over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them.
They're there.82
Judge Richard Posner, in the 2005 Harvard Law Review Forward,
summed up the concern, suggesting that using foreign law "opens up"
"promiscuous opportunities."'83
Second, some argue that citing foreign law is somehow inconsistent
with sovereignty. 4 Sovereigntists85 bristle at the idea that U.S. sover-
eignty may be impinged upon, and they therefore attempt to firmly lo-
cate the U.S. Constitution in peculiarly American realities and dismiss
the idea that decisions from other courts in other countries may be illu-
minating.86 Sujit Choudhry has described this view as legal particularism
in its mild form and legal hegemony in its extreme version.87 Others have
called it exceptionalism, the idea that "the United States Constitution is
unique and that the experience surrounding it is unique."' For example,
Jed Rubenfeld has argued that Americans and Europeans have funda-
Id. at 46-47.
81. Court in Transition: From the H~earings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A26 [hereinafter Court
in Transition] (excerpts from Senate Judiciary Committee's Hearing on the nomination of Judge John
G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice); Edwin Meese III, Commentary: Supreme Choice... with Encore,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at A21.
82. Court in Transition, supra note 81 (Sen. Kyl questioning John Roberts); see also Jim Wooten,
Roberts Right on Court Role, Foreign Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 20, 2005, at A15. Admittedly,
Chief Justice Roberts did not entirely foreclose the use of foreign law as nonbinding, persuasive au-
thority. Rather, he indicated that he would not rely on foreign law as precedent.
83. Posner, supra note 9, at 85.
84. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 47-49.
85. I use the term here only as a means of contrasting those who oppose the citation of foreign
sources with those who do not oppose its citation.
86. Anderson, supra note 9, at 47-48. See generally Tushnet, supra note 55, at 257, 261-62 (de-
scribing the concern that making non-U.S. law a rule of decision "somehow could impair U.S. sover-
eignty and the democratic self-governance of the people of the United States").
87. Choudhry, supra note 64, at 830-32.
88. Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitutional
Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 157, 163 (2002); see also Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with
Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527, 529 (2003) ("[B]ecause supranational lawmaking op-
erates outside those systems of checks and balances and accountability, it risks undermining our Con-
stitution's institutional strategy."). Robert Post makes a similar point in the context of human rights
law as applied by the International Court of Justice. Robert Post, The Challenge of Globalization to
American Public Law Scholarship, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 329 (2001) ("[W]ho makes this
law? Whose identity does it represent? Who sets its goals? ... Stripped of the historically-specific
institutional procedures and legal traditions of particular nation-states, what authority does naked law
hold?").
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mentally different constitutional conceptions.89 Ernest Young, in a simi-
lar vein, has said that when comparing Western Europe to the United
States, "we see divergence rather than convergence on many aspects of
values and political culture." 9°
In many ways, both arguments are cut from the same cloth. Roger
Alford has referred to it as the "international countermajoritarian diffi-
culty": 91 the notion that "federal judges will impose a particular elite's
view of good law on a public that might disagree if it understood what
was at stake."'  Ken Kersch, a political scientist from Princeton, has em-
ployed harsher words, arguing that use of foreign materials "is part of an
elite-driven, politically-motivated worldwide trend toward judicial gov-
ernance, which is antithetical to democratic self-rule, if not to the rule of
law itself."93 For others, the crux is more banal: unless judges confine
themselves to original constitutional understandings, they act illegiti-
mately and undemocratically. 94
II. CRITIQUING THE SOVEREIGNTISTS
The recent barrage of scholarship attacking the use of foreign law
was shrill. But was there substance to the arguments? Should courts
stop cautiously using foreign law and instead categorically bar its use?
When closely examined, the positions taken by those who oppose ever
citing to foreign law in constitutional adjudication seem particularly du-
bious.
A. Confusing Weight and Validity
As an initial matter, scholars who believe that citation to foreign
sources is never appropriate often confuse the issues of weight and valid-
89. Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,
1995-99 (2004).
90. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 161
(2005); see also McGinnis, supra note 9, at 312 ("[A]ny judicial opinion from another culture is the
culmination of a complex institutional structure of producing norms. The low cost of accessing the
mere words of a foreign judicial opinion can blind us to the fact that we are only seeing the surface of a
far deeper social structure that may be incompatible with American institutions."); Young, supra note
88, at 529.
91. Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 9, at 59. Of course, the "countermajori-
tarian difficulty" was a term first coined by Alexander Bickel in his famous 1962 defense of judicial
review. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Vail-Ballou Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
92. Tushnet, supra note 55, at 257.
93. Kersch, supra note 9, at 346.
94. See, e.g., Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005)
("Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding
the meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments,
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronounce-
ments ... inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States."); cf
Dorsen, supra note 3 (Scalia arguing from originalist principles and suggesting that use of foreign law
is problematic even for nonoriginalists).
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ity. In any particular decision, reasons may exist for why certain author-
ity is entitled to little or no weight. Foreign law may particularly lack
persuasive value, for example, if that law is from a country with a signifi-
cantly different cultural, social, or legal context." In these circumstances,
it may be true that the differences are so great that little can be gleaned
from other countries' precedents interpreting similar constitutional pro-
visions.
Not surprising then, scholars who have championed comparative
constitutionalism -like Mark Tushnet,96 Vicki Jackson,97 Frank Michel-
man,98 or Harold Hongju Koh 99-recognize that foreign sources must be
used with care. 1° Justices should use foreign sources in a refined man-
ner01 and be wary of cultural context: l0 '
A common basis of democracy is, however, a necessary but insuffi-
cient condition for comparative analysis. [Judges] must also exam-
ine whether there is anything in the historical development and so-
95. That law is embedded in the culture and history of a nation and its peoples is beyond debate.
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 46 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1946) (1835)
(explaining that social condition is the source of laws).
96. Tushnet, supra note 13; Tushnet, supra note 55; see also Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not)
to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 671
(2005); Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes with Refer-
ence to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2004).
97. Jackson, supra note 55, at 126 (advocating a "slow and incremental approach to considering
foreign law"); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational
Judicial Discourse, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 91 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Hu-
man Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004); Vicki C.
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51
DUKE L.J. 223 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives of Federalism].
98. Frank I. Michelman, Reflection, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1758-59 (2004) (arguing that by
"comparative encounter" our courts "can clarify our picture of ourselves," without advocating for con-
stitutional borrowing).
99. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (2004)
[hereinafter Koh, International Law]; Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479 (2003) [hereinafter Koh, On American Exceptionalism]; Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "De-
cent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085 (2002) [hereinafter
Koh, Paying "Decent Respect"].
100. See also Ackerman, supra note 13, at 771, 774 (encouraging academia to think about world
constitutionalism without "kill[ing] the field by overenthusiastic embrace"); Jacobsohn, supra note 11,
at 1767 ("taking seriously" concerns of cultural particularism but arguing that it "should not preclude
courts from seeking constitutional convergence of legal systems in the incremental and proximate ful-
fillment of transcendent norms of constitutionalism").
101. David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 620
(2001).
102. See, e.g., William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61
WASH. L. REV. 945, 947 (1986) (explaining that "we need to approach foreign subjects with an even
greater tentativeness of theoretical construct and with an even greater self-consciousness than we
would subjects closer to home" and calling for a "careful, contextualized consideration"); Claire
L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 26 (1998) (arguing that judges "must ensure that foreign reasoning
is not imported without sufficient consideration of the context in which it is being applied" because
"solutions developed in one jurisdiction may be inappropriate elsewhere"); Frederick Schauer, Free
Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional Categories, 14 CARDoZO L. REV. 865, 880
(1993) (describing how "constitutional constraints rest on culturally contingent social categories" and
how constitutional interpretation must vary according to cultural history and national differences).
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cial conditions that makes the local and the foreign system different
enough to render interpretative inspiration impracticable.1 °3
Certainly, the "persuasive value of a foreign source will depend on a
combination of its reasoning, the comparability of contexts, and its insti-
tutional origin."' ' t" At times, foreign law may play a very minor, supple-
tive role, or no role at all. But recognizing that foreign sources may be
entitled to less weight than other sources is a far cry from barring foreign
sources from constitutional adjudication.
Kenneth Anderson falls prey to this mistake in his recent article
Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution." In an attempt to denigrate the
practice, Anderson attacks Justice Kennedy's use of foreign law in
Roper."° In particular, Anderson criticizes Justice Kennedy's reliance on
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Inter-
national Convention on Civil and Political Rights on a number of fronts,
including:
" that the Rights of the Child Convention has not been ratified
by the United States; 7
* that the Court ignores "how widely the [Rights of the Child]
Convention features sweeping reservations by individual
countries";
1 8
" that the Convention is "essentially hortatory and honored in
the breach by the nations of the world";" 9
* that the United States ratified the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights with an express reservation.1
Later in his article, Professor Anderson bemoans that foreign law lacks
the embeddedness of our judicial system or the "foreign judicial system
from which it came.. 1. Anderson's criticisms of Roper's reasoning may,
or may not, be sound."' But all of Anderson's arguments concern the
weight of foreign authority and do not support absolutely banning its use.
At bottom, the critique becomes little more than an argument that the
Court simply got the law wrong-an unexceptional point. Indeed, if the
103. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democ-
racy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 113 (2002).
104. Jackson, supra note 55, at 125.
105. Anderson, supra note 9, at 33, 35. In a paper for the Pacific Legal Foundation, Ernesto J.
Sanchez puts forth similar arguments to Anderson as to why he believes Roper was incorrectly de-
cided. Sanchez, supra note 9, at 200.
106. Anderson, supra note 9, at 34.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 35.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 36.
111. Id. at 45-46.
112. This article does not attempt to advocate for, or to justify, any outcome reached by the Court
in any particular case.
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debate is "not whether it is good to look abroad or not, but rather
whether, in a particular case, it is done well or done poorly," then there is
really no debate.113
To be fair, Anderson seems aware of this criticism because he later
suggests that the weight of any given foreign authority is too difficult to
assess.'14 Which is entitled to greater weight, he rhetorically poses, "the
German constitutional court [or] the high court of India?""' Because of
that difficulty, Anderson suggests "a judge can use any of this material
how he or she will.""' 6 The worry of cherry picking is a legitimate con-
cern. Yet Anderson does not explain, and frankly cannot explain, how
this is different in kind from citation to a whole host of other sources that
the Supreme Court uses regularly, tendentiously or not, without com-
ment."7
Constitutional interpretation already permits judges wide leeway,
requiring selection of arguments from "text, intent, precedent, history,
structure, value, and pragmatic consequences.""' 8 Judges also commonly
cite to secondary authorities, such as "scholarly treatises, legal encyclo-
pedias, 'restatements' of the case law, legislative committee reports, law
review articles, legal dictionaries, and even, on occasion, books and arti-
cles that are completely outside 'the law.""'.19 The Court has been known
to star-stud its opinions with citation to sources ranging from M*A*S*H*
and Sesame Street, to books like How to Buy and Care for Tires and
Muscletown USA: Bob Hoffman and the Manly Culture of York Barbell,
113. Kersch, supra note 9, at 369; see also Toobin, supra note 5, at 44.
114. Anderson, supra note 9, at 46.
115. Id.
116. Id. Richard Posner has made the same point. Posner, supra note 9, at 86.
117. One study, analyzing the Court's use of authority in statutory interpretation in the 1980s,
found that the Court had cited to 109 different sources of authority. This authority included not only
"conventional and formal sources," such as statutory text, congressional reports, administrative regula-
tions, and judicial decisions, but also unconventional and informal sources, including law review arti-
cles, famous jurists, the views of private groups, and diplomatic notes. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of
Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1092 (1992); see
also Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Su-
preme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAw LIBR. J. 1 (1983) (describing Su-
preme Court's use of legal periodicals, legal treatises, restatements, legal encyclopedias, nonlegal peri-
odicals, nonlegal treatises, nonlegal reference sources, and statistical publications).
118. Jackson, supra note 55, at 122 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence The-
ory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987)).
119. Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citations, 33
STAN. L. REV. 773, 793-94 (1981); see also Daniels, supra note 117, at 7 (explaining that while only one
case in 1900 cited to a law review article, by 1978, nearly 60% of Supreme Court cases cited to law re-
views); Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by the Courts: An Empirical
Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 665-67 (1998) (discussing history of the Supreme Court's citation to legal
scholarship and finding it to have declined in recent years); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise,
Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000) (describing how
access to nonlegal material, such as newspaper reports and general interest books, has increased the
citation to this material).
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to popular music and poetry, 120 and to works of Plato, Aristotle, Shake-
speare, Montesquieu, and others.1 2' Even extralegal sources, such as the
"views of private groups or individuals," are sometimes cited to support a
decision. 2 2  Judges can use this material in any manner they wish. And
like foreign materials, this authority often is used only persuasively to
support an opinion the Court had arrived at independently. 23
Not only are the sources of authority vast for the modern court, so
too is the substance. As law becomes increasingly interdisciplinary,
"courts must inevitably dabble in a wide range of disciplines in which
they may lack training or expertise-for example, economics in antitrust
cases, science and engineering in patent cases, psychology in criminal
cases."'24 Yet in none of these circumstances, do courts entirely ignore
the complicated interdisciplinary material, even if its weight is indeter-
minate." In fact, many respected commentators have explained how
unconstrained and unconstrainable the use of history is in originalist con-
stitutional interpretation. 126  But this difficulty does not bar the court
from engaging with, and relying on, the historical information. 27
120. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing to a
Cole Porter song); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
the poet John Greenleaf Whittier).
121. Schauer & Wise, supra note 119, at 502-03 (citing Fritz Snyder, The Great Authors and the
Influence of the Supreme Court, 7 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 285, 286 (1987)).
122. Daniels, supra note 117, at 18-20; Zeppos, supra note 117, at 1095.
123. See, e.g., Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court and Legal Writing: Learned Journals as
Vehicles of an Anti-Antitrust Lobby?, 48 GEO. L.J. 105, 142 (1959) (concluding that Supreme Court
Justices cited law reviews in antitrust cases "to support a view which [the Justices] had arrived at more
or less independently of the reasoning in the source referred to").
124. Young, supra note 90, at 166; see also James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme
Court, Empirical Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 65, 66-67, 69-78 (1993) (examining the Supreme Court's use of social science research evidence
in twenty-eight capital punishment cases); cf. David M. O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social
Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 8 (1980) (criticizing the Court's use of social science in its deci-
sions); Peter W. Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond the Adversary
Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280 (1980) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of social science findings).
125. Schauer & Wise, supra note 119, at 501-03 (noting the increase in citation to "textbooks and
academic journals in economics, political science, sociology, psychology, medicine, criminology, phar-
macology, and so on .... ").
126. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
208-09, 221-22 (1980); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutional-
ism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523,525 (1995) (noting that "constitutional discourse is replete with historical
assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers"); Larry D. Kramer, When Lay-
wers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 389 (2003) (discussing how scholars looking at the same
historical materials can come to disparate conclusions); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholar-
ship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 914, 917-18 (1996) (critiquing the use of
history in legal argument and asserting that historical materials are often used to support a precon-
ceived legal conclusion); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis-and the Crisis of His-
tory-in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459 (1997) (describing the varied uses of history in
constitutional interpretation) (book review); cf. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 902-24 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not support or
envision use of originalist methodology).
127. Brest, supra note 126, at 228-29. The most notable example of a court using social science
evidence is Dr. Kenneth Clark's doll studies in Brown v. Board of Education, as famously referred to
in footnote 11 of the opinion. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.l (1954). Dr. Clark's study
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Anderson is not alone in confusing weight with validity. Ernest
Young, for example, verges on a similar error, although in a more subtle
way. In his recent Harvard Law Review piece, Young describes what he
refers to as the "denominator problem. ' 128 In his view, by relying on for-
eign law the Court is able "to bolster claims of 'consensus' against (or in
favor of) a particular practice.1' 29  Young criticizes Justice Kennedy's
analysis in Roper because his use of "foreign law is all about [counting]
noses, not reasons." 3° He explains that the Court cites to "the practice
of foreign jurisdictions without examining the whys and wherefores un-
derlying those practices."'31 Young is certainly correct in his conclusion
that uncritical use is undesirable. But the proper conclusion is not, as
Young implies, that foreign law should never be cited. Instead, his ar-
gument suggests that foreign law should be used in a more developed
way. In fact, the nose-counting problem suggests that foreign law should
be discussed in greater depth and with more sophistication, not less. The
problem is not that foreign law is used, but rather that it is used inade-
quately or superficially.
A related Sovereigntist concern is that foreign law is too difficult to
determine.'32 This concern similarly suffers from a weight versus validity
problem. At most, concluding that foreign law is difficult to ascertain
suggests that judges should use caution. No per se rule of exclusion from
judicial deliberations is warranted, however, simply because something
may be difficult to ascertain.'33 For instance, discerning legislative intent
is classically difficult, but something courts attempt all the time."3
The concern that foreign law is difficult to ascertain is, in any case,
exaggerated.'35 The legal community is better positioned now than it has
was originally published in 1950 as part of a White House conference on the welfare of children. Wil-
liam J. Rich, Betrayal of the Children of the Dolls: The Broken Promise of Constitutional Protection for
Victims of Race Discrimination, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 419-20 n.2 (2005) (citing KENNETH B.
CLARK, THE EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT, WHITE
HOUSE MIDCENTURY CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH (1950)). For further discussion on
doll tests, see Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 9-16 (1995).
128. Young, supra note 90, at 148.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 152, 153-56.
131. Id. at 153.
132. Justice Souter has expressed this concern and suggested skepticism of the Court's ability to
ascertain accurately what foreign law is. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring in judgment) ("The principle enquiry at the moment is into the Dutch experience, and I
question whether an independent front-line investigation into the facts of a foreign country's legal ad-
ministration can be soundly undertaken through American courtroom litigation.").
133. See Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of His-
torical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349,397-98 (1989) (exploring difficulties of reliability in ascertain-
ing legislative intent).
134. See, e.g., id.
135. Anderson, supra note 9; Sanchez, supra note 9, at 40 (arguing the problem is with an "un-
elected judge whose true area of expertise is U.S. law and who lacks access to adequate resources for
research on foreign law and culture"); Young, supra note 90, at 165-66 (arguing that the decision costs
and end costs make the use of foreign materials unattractive).
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007
ever been to identify and understand the laws of other nations. "In the
last fifty years, the discipline has generated a veritable panoply of books,
articles, and reports about foreign law." '136 Significant-literature has been
written about comparative law1 7 and other countries' legal systems, 38
much "of it now go[ing] well beyond black letter rules and often per-
tain[ing] to the foreign system's historical genesis and underlying values,
legal education and actors, institutions and procedures, sources and in-
terpretative practices, and sometimes even cultural habits and (hidden)
working.styles." '39 Attorneys are now exposed to comparative and inter-
national law early in their careers. The "fastest growing area in the
United States law school curriculum is in the international and compara-
tive area."'4 To be sure, "[c]ourse offerings in international and com-
parative law abound; student and faculty exchanges are proliferating;
transnational recruitment of faculty and students is expanding; interna-
tional student initiatives such as mooting, journals, and internships are
multiplying rapidly; [and] visitors' programs and transnational collabora-
tive research projects are ubiquitous. 1141
Comparative analysis is also not the challenge it once was because
today's attorneys are well equipped to engage in comparative analysis.
Modern technology and the availability of experts in foreign law have
136. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671,675 (2002).
137. Comparative legal analysis has long been a mainstay of American law schools. See, e.g., Ar-
thur T. Von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law?, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 624 (1971).
For more recent discussions, see generally Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An
Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 647 (1998); James Gordley, Is Comparative
Law a Distinct Discipline?, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 607 (1998); John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law
Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 771 (1998).
138. Posner, supra note 9, at 80 (noting "the growing literature on constitutional courts in other
countries -a literature that is growing in part because the number and activity of such courts are grow-
ing").
139. Reimann, supra note 136, at 675 (citations omitted).
140. Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Role of Foreign Languages in Educating Lawyers for Trans-
national Challenges, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 779, 783 (2005); see also Jeffery Atik & Anton Soub-
bot, International Legal Education, 36 INT'L LAW 715, 715 (2002) (explaining that "[tihe effects of
globalization and, in particular, the events of September 11 have led to redoubled efforts by U.S. law
schools to expand and deepen the study of international law" and that "[tihere are signs that the mar-
ginalization of international legal study in U.S. law schools (evidenced by its traditional place in upper-
division, elective courses) is giving way to a new recognition of its centrality"); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
The International Dimension of Law School Curriculum, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 417, 417-18
(2004). International and comparative law courses have long topped the list of new curricular offer-
ings at law schools. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Jennifer Cihon, New Course Offerings in the
Upper-Level Curriculum: Report of an AALS Survey, 47 J. LEGAL EDuc. 524, 538-40 (1997). For a
particular example, see John E. Sexton, The Global Law School Program at New York University, 46
J. LEGAL EDUC. 329-31,334 (1996).
141. Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 160 (2004); see also Al-
berto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal Education, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 137 (1995); John F. Murphy & Jeffery Atik, International Legal Education, 37 INT'L
LAW. 623, 623 (2003) (discussing whether it is desirable for all law students to have some exposure to
international or transnational law and describing current developments in legal education).
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made foreign decisions more accessible. 42 David Fontana has made the
point well:
With the assistance of an expert (preferably one schooled in the
language, culture, and law of the foreign country), or even without
one, this process of comparison and analogical reasoning is nothing
new to the judge. The judge of the future, and the lawyer of today,
has practiced law or taught law in the era of globalization, when a
lawyer must be familiar with some aspects of foreign law.143
Even without experts, courts can draw from an ever-increasing number
of amicus briefs to gauge the soundness of arguments, a" even those based
on foreign law.145 In short, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has noted:
"[t]oday, tools are readily at hand to pursue international and compara-
tive law inquiries." '146
Perhaps an obvious retort is to ask exactly what weight to afford
foreign law in any particular case. Many scholars have grappled with this
worthwhile question. In a seminal article,'47 Sujit Choudhry described
different ways that foreign law can be used in constitutional adjudica-
tion.148 Likewise, David Fontana has crafted a typology of uses.'49 He
concludes that foreign sources may be used appropriately in "hard
cases"'150 when there are no helpful American judicial precedents, when
the American sources are unclear, and when the foreign sources aid to
craft a rule or standard.15' In similar fashion, Joan Larsen has attempted
to describe the different uses of foreign law-expository, empirical, and
moral fact finding-and then normatively evaluate those uses.' Others,
such as Melissa Waters and Vicki Jackson, have suggested different ap-
proaches ranging from nonparticipation or resistance, to convergence, to
engagement,'53 while constitutional scholars, like Mark Tushnet, have of-
142. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom: Judging in the
New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 291 (1997) (describing how advances in technology have
lead to the growing internationalization of the judiciary); Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 3 ("The Internet
affords access to foreign judicial decisions, law journals contain all manner of commentary, course ma-
terials are well packaged."); International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 67, at 2055; L'Heureux-Dubd,
supra note 102, at 25 (describing how the Internet and other advances in communication technology
allow judges to more easily access decisions from foreign jurisdictions).
143. Fontana, supra note 101, at 620.
144. Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Su-
preme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 744-45 (2000) (describing the use and increased number of
amicus briefs before the Supreme Court).
145. See Jason Morgan Foster, Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon Disenfranchisement:
Reexamining Richardson v. Ramirez, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 279,293-95 (2006).
146. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 3.
147. Levinson, supra note 62, at 354 (describing Choudhry's work as "splendid, indeed seminal").
148. Choudhry, supra note 64, at 825-26.
149. Fontana, supra note 101, at 550-56.
150. Id. at 558.
151. Id. at 553-54.
152. Larsen, supra note 37.
153. Jackson, supra note 55, at 112-15 (describing convergence, resistance, and engagement mod-
els of constitutional comparativism); Waters, supra note 54, at 555-72 (describing different uses of
comparative materials and foreign law).
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fered different theoretical justifications for the use of foreign law.'54
Many others have attempted the same."'
Although the approaches are varied, generally at least three factors
are recognized as determining the weight and applicability of foreign
law.'56 First, a court must consider the historical connection between the
two countries-whether "for a considerable time the two systems had the
same sources from which they derived their legal doctrines, principles,
procedures, methods, and ideas."'57 Second, a court should evaluate the
similarity between the legal systems.'58 Third, the court must decide
whether the constitutional institutions are analogous.'5 9 Strikingly, how-
ever, the recent literature denunciating the use of foreign law largely ig-
nores this scholarship. Justice Scalia and "his supporters from the side-
lines" would ignore this nuance in preference for an absolute rule." °
B. An Attack on Sovereignty?
A second criticism that Sovereigntists commonly proffer is that use
of foreign law "surrenders U.S. sovereignty to non-U.S. decision-
makers" who are not accountable to the people of the United States.61
154. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1228-29 (describing functionalism, expressivism, and bricologe as
three justifications for constitutional borrowing).
155. See, e.g., Annus, supra note 16, at 311-42 (distinguishing between different uses of compara-
tive law); Brun-Otto Bryde, The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue,
80 TUL. L. REV. 203, 213-19 (setting forth the uses of foreign law and the legitimacy of those uses);
Eskridge, supra note 53, at 558-60 (describing some of the appropriate uses for comparative constitu-
tionalism); Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count? Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 401-40 (2005) (creating a framework for selection of for-
eign authorities based on differentiating between nations); McCrudden, supra note 66, at 517-27 (ar-
guing that the persuasiveness of foreign authority is dictated by the nature of the political regime in
which the foreign court is situated, the pedagogical impulse, and the existence of common alliances,
among other factors); Waldron, supra note 14, at 139-43 (describing how to use foreign law as ius gen-
tium); see also H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261, 265-88 (1987) (explaining
how the concept of persuasive authority justifies the extensive use of foreign, nonbinding sources of
law); cf. Bruce Carolan, The Search for Coherence in the Use of Foreign Court Judgments by the Su-
preme Court of Ireland, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 123 (2004) (attempting to offer insight into
when foreign sources should be used by demonstrating how the Supreme Court of Ireland has used
foreign sources in several well-known Irish cases).
156. Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 319,
322 (1957).
157. Id. at 342.
158. Id. at 322.
159. Id.
160. Jacobsohn, supra note 11, at 1767.
161. Tushnet, supra note 55, at 261; see, e.g., Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 9,
at 58 (arguing that "[u]sing global opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically
undermines sovereignty"); Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the
Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 547, 548 (2004) (arguing that the U.S. criminal justice system's sov-
ereignty is threatened by the "insinuation" of foreign law into death penalty decisions); see also Ap-
propriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 49 (2004)
(statement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professor of Government, Cornell University) (arguing that the Euro-
pean Union "is really set on ... undermining American sovereignty" by "infiltrat[ing] into our judicial
system this idea that our judges need to listen to what their judges say").
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The point, at least superficially, seems an obvious one: "[t]o the extent
that a state is subject to law made elsewhere, it has lost its sovereignty,
and, perhaps, in some deep way, its right to call itself a 'state. 16 2 True,
perhaps; but as a reason for categorically barring the use of foreign law,
nonsense.
As an initial matter, the argument fundamentally misconceives the
nature of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the right to independence, "that is
the right to exercise, within a portion of the globe and to the exclusion of
other States, the functions of a State." '63 Sovereignty embodies the right
"to be left alone, to exclude, to be free from any external meddling or in-
terference."'" Sovereignty is, therefore, what a nation makes of it. It
cannot be "violated if a nation, through one of its branches, executive,
legislative, or judicial, makes an autonomous decision to align its laws
with other nations. This choice, exercised independently of other na-
tions, constitutes an exercise of, and not a violation of, a state's right to
self-determination."165 To "acknowledge the propriety of comparative
analysis hardly entails a surrender of sovereignty."'"
Similarly, the idea that somehow the Court is bowing to the whims
of foreigners and thereby endangering sovereignty is simply untrue.'6 7
That suggestion confuses the use of foreign law as an interpretative aid
with presuming that foreign law is controlling. The suspicion that the
Court is using foreign sources for something more than persuasive au-
thority is sheer speculation. 68 The Court "may be seeking information,
guidance, stimulation, clarification, or even enlightenment," but there is
no evidence that it turns to foreign law for binding authority. 69 The
162. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the
U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1993 (2004).
163. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 379 (2d ed.
2002); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 2003) (de-
scribing principles of equality and nonintervention among sovereign nations); MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 330-50 (2d ed. 1993) (explaining the nature of sovereignty).
164. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 283, 284 (2004).
165. Po-Jen Yap, Transnational Constitutionalism in the United States: Toward A Worldwide Use
of Interpretive Modes of Comparative Reasoning, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2005); see also Al-
einikoff, supra note 162, at 2000 ("Because transnational norms can only be made binding in the
United States as permitted by domestic law, their application domestically results from an exercise of
sovereignty-and therefore cannot constitute an abridgment of sovereignty."); Tushnet, supra note 55,
at 262 ("[T]he language of sovereignty obscures the fact that it is always a domestic decision-maker
who concludes that a non-U.S. rule should be a rule of decision within the United States.") (emphasis
omitted).
166. Law, supra note 4, at 657.
167. See generally Tushnet, supra note 1 (describing the references to non-U.S. law in U.S. Su-
preme Court majority opinions); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More?
Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275,
1286 (2006).
168. Law, supra note 4, at 657 ("If the point is instead to emphasize that Americans must remain
masters of their own destiny, no one on the Court has suggested otherwise.").
169. Laurie W. H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism In South Africa: A Response to Sir
Basil Markesinis and Jorg Fedtke, 80 TUL. L. REV. 169, 183 (2005) (arguing that sovereignty concerns
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Court's use of foreign law is a recognition only that "no [nation] is so
unique that it has neither anything to say to, or learn from, other [na-
tions].' 7°
Alexander Aleinikoff has made a more cutting, if not fundamental,
point. As Aleinikoff explains, the Sovereigntist objection to using for-
eign law because of sovereignty loss, "starts with an unrealistic view of
states as hermetically sealed polities exercising sole jurisdiction over
their territory and people." ' This version of sovereignty "does not exist
and perhaps has never existed.' 1 72 Constitutional law is "not free from
outside influences; nor has it ever been. ' 173 Perhaps more telling, states
are often subject to laws, directly or indirectly, to which the state did not
expressly consent. This can be either in the form of customary interna-
tional norms174 or through other states extraterritorially applying their
laws. 17'
That so many politicians appear concerned about the possibility that
courts could be influenced by law made elsewhere is ironic: the United
States attempts to impose its law abroad all the time. 176  The United
States routinely discounts or disregards the sovereignty of other na-
tions. 17  Setting aside recent military operations, the disregard is evident
in how the law permits broad jurisdictional assertions over foreigners on
suspect bases,'178 and our increased willingness to apply our laws extrater-
ritorially.179 Even the U.S. judiciary all-too-often tends to ignore the im-
pact its decisions have on other countries and legal systems."
A final point-perhaps the most crucial one-is worth emphasizing.
Paradoxically, the Sovereigntists may have it backwards (or, at least, are
are "red herrings"); see also Jackson, supra note 55, at 128 ("[F]oreign law requires issue-by-issue
analysis and does not necessarily mean adoption, but thoughtful, well-informed consideration.").
170. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1162; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) ("Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.").
171. Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 1994.
172. Id. (citing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20-25 (1999)).
173. Law, supra note 4, at 658.
174. Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 1994.
175. Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter D~jd Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental
Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U.
L. REV. 363, 395 (2005) (discussing the extraterritorial application of law).
176. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
LAW 36-37 (Dieten Lange & Gary Born eds., 1987).
177. See Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46
A.F.L. REV. 217,224-26 (1999).
178. Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident,
Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 51-53 (2006).
179. Parrish, supra note 175, at 393-99; see also Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005) (discussing the changing nature of territorial sovereignty and the ex-
pansion of the extraterritorial application of law). For an overview on the extraterritorial application
of law, see generally William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998) and William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws The-
ory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998).
180. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty- U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 639 (2002); see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (recogniz-
ing that forcible abduction of Mexican national from Mexico did not preclude U.S. criminal trial).
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too late). Globalization of the judiciary and constitutional decision mak-
ing is here and will surely continue. 81 To the extent that the lines be-
tween the domestic and the foreign have blurred, it has occurred al-
ready.8 2 Transnational and global litigation is part of our court system,'83
and the United States is becoming "more vulnerable to the imposition of
international norms."' 8 "As community boundaries diverge from na-
tional ones, law making may migrate from national institutions toward
global ones."' 85 Having domestic courts engage with foreign or transna-
tional materials, then, may be a way for us to shape that law as we see fit.
But ignoring it will not make it go away. In this context, engaging with
foreign law and using it in constitutional decision making may ultimately
help shore up U.S. sovereignty, rather than erode it.
C. Old Wine, New Bottles: Originalism and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty
If the Sovereigntists are not lamenting the loss of national sover-
eignty, then their indictment often mirrors longstanding debates over
certain kinds of constitutional interpretation.'86 Sovereigntists believe
that citation to foreign sources permits judges to engage in inappropriate
policymaking.187 Largely, then, the rejection of the use of foreign materi-
als rests on the argument that judges must confine themselves to consid-
ering the original intention of the Framers when deciding constitutional
cases, something foreign law has little to say about. Naturally,
"[o]riginalism and textualism are particularly incompatible with com-
parative analysis"'" because comparativism is not bound by history or
text. But why should these theories stop the U.S. Supreme Court from
continuing to use foreign sources?
As a preliminary matter, originalism-in its extreme form-has
been "widely critiqued as unrealistic and unworkable" for a variety of
181. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1113-15 (2000) (de-
scribing legal globalization); see also John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of
Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS
373, 383 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996) (describing how international human rights
decisions are increasingly being quoted by national courts and accepted by them).
182. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 649, 727-30 (2002) (describing how globalization has restructured how nation-states exercise
their powers, has left the "United States more vulnerable to the imposition of international norms,"
and how "no country-not even the supposed sole superpower-can resist or insulate itself from
global forces").
183. Parrish, supra note 178, at 43.
184. Spiro, supra note 182, at 730.
185. Id.; cf. Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN. L. REV. 907,
914-19 (2005) (discussing transnational harmonization of constitutional ideas and arguing that even
the most enduring constitutions are not entirely indigenous).
186. See Jackson, supra note 55, at 111.
187. See id. at 122.
188. Blum, supra note 88, at 162.
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reasons.189 First, in practice the Court itself does not fully embrace strict
originalist methodology, and never has.1" Second, accurately determin-
ing what the Framers' views were as to most constitutional provisions is
near impossible.191 Historians have questioned whether, at the time of
ratification, constitutional language like "equality" and "liberty" even
had a fixed meaning from which to derive original understanding.1
2
Third, that originalism will restrain judges more than other interpretative
methodologies is unlikely, and at least, controverted. For many, "origi-
nal understanding [is] no more than an artifice for imposing [the judge's]
own political vision .... ,,19 At the very least, the countermajoritarian
difficulty that lies at the heart of originalist thinking may be overblown.194
Some scholars go further, suggesting that the "countermajoritarian issue
[is] an 'obsession' of law professors cloistered in their ivory towers, in-
congruent with (or even irrelevant to) popular conceptions of the Court
and judicial review."' 95  Social science has repeatedly shown that the
Court enjoys widespread and broad legitimacy-much more so than the
other branches of government. 196 And despite fears of judicial activism,
the justices "accept the conventional law-constrained conception of
189. Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (2006); see also Brest, supra note 126, at 204-
05 (critiquing the problems with originalism); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1087-99 (1989); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877-78 (1996) (explaining that the text and original understand-
ings play a small role in understanding what the Constitution requires). Textualism has received simi-
lar critiques. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006)
("Textualism has outlived its utility as an intellectual movement.").
190. Zeppos, supra note 117, at 1099-120 (concluding, after analyzing citation patterns, that
originalist methodology is absent from the Court and that "the Court's approach is eclectic, relying not
only on text and originalist sources, but on practical considerations and other dynamic sources as
well").
191. See Brest, supra note 126, at 13-17; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 39
(1985).
192. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 59-65 (1955).
193. Anthony E. Cook, The Temptation and Fall of Original Understanding, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1163,
1164; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1209-17 (1987) (arguing that "there simply is no value-neutral way to
choose among possible specifications of the framers' abstract intent").
194. Friedman, supra note 76, at 159. Not long ago, the concern of constitutional theory was not a
countermajoritarian difficulty, but a majoritarian one. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1158 ("The question
that academics and judges pondered then was not the courts' own legitimacy in a democratic order,
but the legitimacy of rule by a majority that, unregulated, threatened little more than mob action.").
195. Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the Curtain: The Supreme Court, Popular
Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem, 73 UMKC L. REV. 53, 53 (2004).
196. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS'
BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 99 (2002) (recounting focus-group studies and
research regarding public opinions about the Supreme Court); see also Rosalee A. Clawson et al., The
Legitimacy-Conferring Authority of the U.S. Supreme Court: An Experimental Design, 29 AM. POL.
RES. 566, 568-69 (2001) (describing public support for the Supreme Court as compared to other
branches of government); Louis Michael Seidman, What's So Bad About Bush v. Gore? An Essay on
Our Unsettled Election, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 953, 960-62 & nn.15-18 (2001) (citing polling data on the
Supreme Court after Bush v. Gore and finding that public approval of the Court remained high).
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judges and believe they conform to it."'" This is not pure conjecture.
"[E]mpirical studies of voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices never
find that ideology explains anywhere near 100% of the Justices' votes."'98
A particularly apt critique of originalism also exists in circumstances
when the history and text are ambiguous. "Methodologically, the doc-
trine is backwards: as the subjects of debate become more difficult, the
need to be open to the widest possible sources increases.""' Constitu-
tional provisions often do "not have a single, definite meaning in any
community prior to the process of interpretation. '"2" The constitutional
meaning is therefore
not a thing waiting to be discovered by a judge. It only has an iden-
tifiable shape after the judge articulates the conclusion of an inter-
pretative inquiry.... [I]t is not possible for a judge-or anyone
else-to consider the meaning of [constitutional language] without
drawing on a wealth of experiences, arguments, and values that
range across local, national, and even international communities.201
Stated differently, foreign materials should not be used when the consti-
tutional text and history speak clearly;2 2 but they may be used when the
conventional legal materials do not exist, and the justices, "deprived of
these crutches," have to make discretionary calls.2 3
A more provocative point can be made. Adhering solely to strict
originalism in interpreting the Constitution "means accepting the judg-
ments of people who lived centuries ago in a society that was very differ-
ent from ours."' °4 As a society, however, we have far more in common-
demographically, culturally, morally, and in our historical experiences-
with foreigners in the twenty-first century than we do with Americans of
the 1780s or 1860s. 5 Richard Posner, although more recently appearing
197. Posner, supra note 9, at 52.
198. Id. at 49.
199. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1160.
200. Id. at 1161.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Virtually all Constitutional scholars agree that the specific intentions of the Framers count
for something and that sometimes the text can be decisive. Brest, supra note 126, at 236
("[N]onoriginalist adjudication... accord[s] presumptive weight to the text and original history."); see
also Fallon, supra note 193, at 1244; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflec-
tions on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1242 n.66 (1995).
203. Posner, supra note 9, at 40.
204. Strauss, supra note 189, at 880; see also Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
381, 381 (1997) (describing and critiquing the "dead-hand problem of constitutionalism: Why should
today's generation be ruled from the grave?"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (describing the dead-
hand problem).
205. Tushnet, supra note 204, at 880; see also Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitu-
tional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065, 1082 (1997)
("[P]opulations change, and change profoundly over time. Immigrants arrive, old ways die out, new
priorities arise. People governed by today's decisions do not bear much necessary relation to those
who yielded their sovereign power to a state government originally."); cf Michael Kirby, Constitu-
tional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship?, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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to repudiate his prior position, 2 ° has explained how evidence of foreign
practices may thus be more relevant than evidence of original intent:
If a law could be said to be contrary to world public opinion I would
consider this a reason, not compelling but not negligible either, for
regarding a state law as unconstitutional even if the Constitution's
text had to be stretched a bit to cover it. The study of other laws, or
of world opinion as crystallized in foreign law and practices, is a
more profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenth-
century evidence [of the Framers' intent] . 207
Indeed, "[w]hy should we care more about the intent of the Founders-
who are long-dead as well as culturally removed from us-than about the
understandings of contemporary judges struggling with the same prob-
lems . . . ?,2
But even if one were to accept originalism as the only legitimate
method of constitutional interpretation, originalism struggles to explain
why citation to foreign sources must be banned in constitutional decision
making. The Framers' reliance on international sources should lead "a
justice devoted to originalism to look, like the framers themselves, to-
ward-not away from -international opinion. "209 As a historical matter,
the use of foreign materials has a "venerable history in constitutional in-
terpretation. 210 The suggestion that citation to foreign law is new and
unprecedented' is empirically wrong.212 Comparative analysis, for its
206. Posner, supra note 9, at 84-90; see also Posner, supra note 58, at 40-42.
207. Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1996).
208. Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677, 2678
(2003).
209. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 47; see also Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 2-3 (ex-
plaining how the Framers intended that the new nation would be bound by international law and
would respect world opinion); Koh, Paying "Decent Respect," supra note 99, at 1087-90 (explaining
how the Framers understood the term "Law of Nations").
210. Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 421, 423-24 (2004) (arguing that "the use of international law in constitutional interpreta-
tion has a long history, and reflects the Framers' own interest in and concern about international
law"); see also JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 13, at v ("Centuries ago scholars and political activists
ranging from Aristotle to James Madison compared and analyzed systems of government to determine
how best to constitute polities."); Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 56 ("When phrases like
'due process of law,' 'equal protection,' and 'cruel and unusual punishments' are illuminated by paral-
lel rules, empirical evidence, or community standards found in other mature legal systems, that evi-
dence should not simply be ignored. Wise American judges did not do so at the beginning of the Re-
public, and there is no warrant for them to start now."); cf The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (explaining that judges were to look "to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat").
211. Anderson, supra note 9, at 33 (noting that before Roper "the appearance of foreign law in
constitutional decisions [was possibly] nothing more than a minor hobbyhorse for Justice Stephen
Breyer or Justice Kennedy").
212. For an extensive detailing of the use of foreign law in U.S. decisions, see generally Calabresi
& Zimdahl, supra note 23. See also Alain A. Levasseur, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in
THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 315, 325-31 (1997) (describing the uses of comparative
law by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1907 through 1995). For cases that have cited to comparative
materials, see, for example, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (noting that Can-
ada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia are embroiled in debates over physician-assisted sui-
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part, has long been used in U.S. Supreme Court decisions." 3 Interna-
tional law-as distinguished perhaps from all foreign materials-cannot
be irrelevant to constitutional interpretation because the U.S. Constitu-
tion itself openly refers to international law. 214 The Court itself has rec-
ognized its relevance: "International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate ju-
risdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly pre-
sented for their determination. '215 Indeed, ignoring the practices of other
countries-according to Professor Harold Hongju Koh-would "consti-
tute a stunning reversal of history. ' 216 Vicki Jackson has recently made
much the same point.217
Aside from the use of foreign law to decide cases, early American
legal scholars were well versed in foreign materials:
Early opinions of the Court and leading treatises of the nineteenth
century took international and comparative law far more seriously
than courts and scholars in the twentieth century. James Madison
studied the constitutions of the world in preparing to write the
American document. Early U.S. jurists were schooled on the lead-
ing international treatises, the lex mercatoria, the law of prizes,
Roman citizenship law, and British constitutionalism.15
Some commentators have argued that given our constitutional connec-
tions with international human rights, the reference to foreign law is par-
cide) and New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 n.5 (1946) (discussing laws in Canada, Austra-
lia, and Brazil to support decision). See also M. H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception of Foreign
Law in the Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 753 (2002) (describing how, early in the
nation's history, the courts turned "to Europe and European legal systems for its legal development").
213. Fontana, supra note 101, at 545-49, 591 (noting the "long career" of comparative reasoning
in Constitutional cases). Admittedly, the opposition to citing to foreign sources also has a long history.
Young, supra note 90, at 149 n.11 ("In the early Republic, for example, several states enacted statutes
forbidding their courts even to cite to English common law decisions.").
214. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power "[t]o define and pun-
ish... Offenses against the Law of Nations"); see also Neuman, supra note 53, at 82 (explaining how
the U.S. Constitution "assume[si an international law background, which does not provide an exclu-
sive source for the meaning of the constitutional text but does provide an essential resource for con-
struing it").
215. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (ex-
plaining how international law "is part of our law,, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice"); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (cautioning
that congressional acts should "never... be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possi-
ble construction remains"); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 474 (1793) (noting the ability to
rely on the "laws of nations").
216. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 45; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 1989
(noting that "[t]here is nothing terribly new" in looking "at foreign sources of law as aids in constitu-
tional interpretation").
217. Jackson, supra note 55, at 109-11 (explaining that reference to foreign and international law
is a "traditional method[] of analysis" and that "references to foreign law go way back in U.S. constitu-
tional history").
218. Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 1989; see also Levasseur, supra note 212, at 316-24 (explaining
how U.S. courts historically referred to foreign law sources); Childress, supra note 58, at 200 (explain-
ing that "before the American Civil War, courts regularly referred to Roman law, civil law (that is, the
law of continental Europe), and English common law").
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ticularly appropriate when the Court is addressing an issue related to
human rights.219
But whether originalism supports citing to foreign law may be the
juridical equivalent of debating how many angels can stand on the head
of a pin. If the point is solely that originalism is preferred to other meth-
ods of interpretation-the point Justice Scalia seems to make 220 -then
the debate is very ordinary indeed.22 ' Deciding whether the use of for-
eign law is appropriate cannot require resolving the difficult and, per-
haps, unsolvable question of what method of judicial interpretation is
best. The wide-ranging debate over what constitutional interpretation
requires has been ongoing for years with no end in sight. Nor is it realis-
tic to believe that judges will universally apply one interpretative ap-
proach to all cases.22 If a judge wishes to embrace a certain interpreta-
tive methodology, she should do so on its own terms. But the use of
foreign law itself is not a reason for adopting or rejecting a particular in-
terpretative methodology.
D. The Sovereigntist Position: How Extreme?
Before turning to an affirmative explanation for why using foreign
sources may well be sensible, one might ask whether the suggestion to
ban the use of foreign materials-not to mention, as some senators sug-
gest, to render its use an impeachable offense-is a radical one. Quite
radical.
Underscoring the extremity of the Sovereigntist position is not diffi-
cult. First, as explained above, the U.S. Supreme Court has used foreign
law sources in constitutional analysis since the early days of the Union.2 23
219. See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3, 6 (1983) ("[M]ost United State courts, both state and
federal, show less inclination now than at the beginning of the Republic to use sources of foreign, in-
ternational, and customary law to aid interpretation, especially in constitutional cases."); Nadine
Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal
Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 825 (1989) (arguing that the Framers
intended to resort to "international human rights standards"); cf Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights
and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1890-99 (2003) (describ-
ing how national constitutional systems can incorporate and accommodate international human
rights).
220. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (Scalia, J.) (stating that "such compara-
tive analysis [to international law] is inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution").
221. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 167, at 1277 (arguing that some criticisms of references to non-U.S.
law are "entirely parasitic on some other argument-which is merely asserted, not defended" and
"deployed in a wide range of contexts, not just this one").
222. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4, 13 (1996)
(noting that the Supreme Court has never made an "official choice" among competing theories of in-
terpretation). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535 (1999) (describing and evaluating various theories of interpretation).
223. See supra Part lI.C; see also David Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic
Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 445, 457 (2004)
("[I]t would be more accurate to say we have had a Court that has paid at least some attention to
transnational law for a long time, and many people are just now noticing."); Glensy, supra note 155, at
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It is the new Sovereigntist view that the "practices of other countries are
irrelevant to understanding" American constitutional concepts that is
"anomalous. '224  Second, the Framers contemplated that courts would
use foreign materials and engage in comparative analysis z.2 ' Third, other
modern constitutional courts frequently use comparative constitutional
analysis.226  Numerous scholars have explained these points.227  Less
known, however, and one of the contributions this article hopes to make
to the debate, is how our state court system routinely engages in com-
parative constitutionalism. The categorical rejection of foreign materials
contradicts a practice deeply embedded in our legal system.
Comparative constitutionalism is a hallmark of our state court sys-
tem. Each of the fifty states-with their own separate judicial systems
and constitutional law-extensively cite to one another when interpret-
ing their state constitutions without any hue and cry.22 The practice has
been continuous since the 1800s.229 State supreme courts not only rou-
tinely cite to "foreign" decisions, but actively encourage lawyers appear-
ing before them to rely on those decisions.23°  "The prevailing practice
has been for the courts in one state to consider, and often cite in support
361-62 ("United States courts have, from the founding of the nation to the present day, referenced
foreign legal sources in a variety of different contexts."); Jackson, supra note 55, at 110-11 n.7 (citing a
laundry list of cases showing that references to foreign and international sources "occur episodically in
constitutional decisions throughout the Court's history").
224. Jackson, supra note 55, at 110.
225. See discussion supra Part II.C.
226. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
227. See id.
228. Harding, supra note 63, at 422; see also James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why
Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1263-64 (2005)
(noting that "American courts have a long tradition of consulting related rulings from other jurisdic-
tions when analyzing issues arising under the law of their own jurisdictions.... [And even] in constitu-
tional law despite the fact that the answers to constitutional questions are in principle to be found ex-
clusively within the four corners of the relevant constitution.").
229. Friedman et al., supra note 119, at 797-98, 801-03 (studying 5900 cases from forty-eight
states and finding that "out-of-state citations account[ed] for roughly 40% of all case citation in the
1870-1970 period" and that "out-of-state cases are cited often-24,956 times, to be precise (out of a
total of over 60,000 cites in the 5,900 cases)"); see also James N. G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in
the New Judicial Federalism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 783, 788, 790-94 (2003)
(study of thirteen state supreme courts' citation to other state supreme court decisions when interpret-
ing state constitutional rights); cf. Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 835, 838, 847-64 (1997) (collecting a "comprehensive list of the occasions on which a
state's highest court referred to the constitution of another state"). Federal courts on occasion also
look to state court decisions for guidance. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partnership: The
Future Relationship of Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 729, 742 (1988) ("Just
as the opinions of the state courts have been enriched by analysis of and response to the federal cases,
so may the opinions of the federal courts be enriched by analysis of and response to the state cases.").
230. See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Conn. 1992) (listing "sister state decisions" as
a "tool[] of analysis" for interpreting the Connecticut constitution); State v. Wheaton, 825 P.2d 501,
504-05 (Idaho 1992) (Bistline, J., concurring) (indicating the court's receptiveness to relying on sister
state decisions in interpreting the Idaho constitution); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex.
1992) (encouraging citation to sister state constitutional decisions); State v. Zaccaro, 574 A.2d 1256,
1259 (Vt. 1990) (explaining that when interpreting the Vermont state constitution, the Court "may
look for guidance to persuasive holdings.., from sister-state jurisdictions"); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d
233, 237 (Vt. 1985) (urging attorneys to argue other state precedent).
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of their own decisions, the developing jurisprudence in other states. This
sort of cross-fertilization has been a distinctive feature of the state consti-
tutional law movement."23' Judges uniformly find decisions of other state
supreme courts-even on constitutional matters-"relevant and appro-
priate for consideration." '232 One recent study of thirteen state courts of
last resort found that over one-third of the decisions involving interpreta-
tion of state constitutional provisions included citation to out-of-state au-
thority.233 In more than three-quarters of those decisions, the courts cited
to more than one out-of-state decision.234 They even, on occasion, cite to
other nations' decisions and international law.235
Of course, when state courts cite to similar decisions from other ju-
risdictions, they do so only as persuasive authority.236 Universal agree-
ment exists that "state supreme courts have the unquestioned, final au-
thority to interpret their state constitutions. ' 237  State "courts seem to
consult rulings from other jurisdictions more to educate themselves than
to inquire into any authoritative constraints on how they themselves may
rule. '238  "[Jiudges seek only to gain the benefit of relevant human ex-
perience for the purpose of sharpening their own decision making; the
consulted ruling carries no more intrinsic weight than would, say, a work
of history or a law review article. '239  State courts thus do not consult
"foreign" authority with any "belief that judicial rulings from other juris-
dictions are in any sense binding within the consulting jurisdiction.'24
231. Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Sympo-
sium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT L. REV. 13, 23 (1988); see also David Blum-
berg, Influence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on State High Court Decisionmaking
1982-1997: A Study in Horizontal Federalism, 61 ALB; L. REV. 1583 (1998) (detailing the extensive
citation to and reliance on decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by other state
courts in deciding constitutional questions); Mary Anne Bobinski, Citation Sources and the New York
Court of Appeals, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 965, 1002 (1985) (noting the prevalence of citations to the deci-
sions of other jurisdictions in the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals); James Leonard, An
Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, LAw LIBR. J. 129, 152
(1994) ("[When faced with more difficult issues, the Ohio Supreme Court is more likely to
cite.., nonbinding foreign sources ...."); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Su-
preme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453, 462-66 (1996) (describing how Montana courts have traditionally
cited to out-of-state decisions from throughout the country).
232. Gregory A. Caldeira, Legal Precedent: Structures of Communication Between State Supreme
Courts, 10 Soc. NETWORKS 29, 30 n.2 (1988).
233. Cauthen, supra note 229, at 790.
234. Id.
235. See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 & n.21 (Or. 1981). In that case, the Oregon Supreme
Court examined "not only traditional sources of persuasive authority such as decisions of sister state
courts, but also Eighteenth Century treatises on penology and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV.
199, 224 (1998).
236. CHRISTINA L. KUNZ ET AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 6 (4th ed. 1996).
237. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism,
28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100 (2000); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)
(affirming state court authority to interpret its own law and rejecting federal court authority to revisit
that interpretation).
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The same tradition exists when the state courts have interpreted
provisions similar to federal constitutional provisions. In those circum-
stances, not only do state courts turn to the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions for guidance, but the federal interpretation is presumed (rightly or
wrongly) correct.24" ' "[C]ongruence with federal decisional law is as-
sumed to be the norm, and deviation is for all intents and purposes im-
possible. ' 24 2  Even if this conclusion overgeneralizes, 243 it is widely be-
lieved that when interpreting state constitutional provisions, the state
court should refer to U.S. Supreme Court and other state court opinions
as "important guides on the subjects which they squarely address."112" Of
course, as with state-to-state citation, although citation to the U.S. Su-
preme Court is common, all recognize that the state courts constitute an
"'independent appellate judiciary, and do not exist, when it comes to in-
terpreting the Constitution and the laws of the state, solely to mimic de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.' 245
If the Sovereigntists are correct-that citation to foreign law un-
dermines court legitimacy-then state courts should never cite to sister
241. Friesen, supra note 205, at 1067-69 (condemning the "uncritical adoption, when giving mean-
ing to state constitutional rights, of verbal formulas that the United States Supreme Court uses to
measure federal constitutional rights or powers" and calling for the creation of "a truly independent
set of constitutional rules at the state level"); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Le-
gitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 356 (1984).
242. Friedman, supra note 237, at 103 (citing Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The
Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 638 (1994)); see also
James A. Gardner, The 'States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 475, 488-89 (1996). States have, however, over time interpreted their own constitutional provi-
sions more broadly than federal provisions. JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION:
EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:07 (2006) (noting that while "the Burger Court pur-
sued a pattern of retrenchment, stopping the advance of the Warren Court's expansion of equal pro-
tection, state courts, particularly those of the most urbanized jurisdictions, commenced a pattern of
expanding rights through interpretation of the state constitutional equivalents to the federal equal pro-
tection clause").
243. State constitutionalism, and the idea that state constitutions could provide greater protec-
tions than the federal constitution, did not emerge until the mid-1970s. Justice Brennan's famous 1977
Harvard Law Review article is often seen as the fountainhead of the state constitutionalism movement.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 502-04 (1977); see also James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legiti-
macy of Independent State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1509 (1998) (observing
that since Justice Brennan's Harvard Law Review article appeared, "[sitate courts have now rendered
hundreds of decisions which grant greater protection to individual rights.., than the Supreme Court
has been willing to afford under the Federal Constitution"); Stewart G. Pollack, State Constitutions as
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983) (characterizing Justice
Brennan's Harvard Law Review article as the "Magna Carta of state constitutional law"); David
Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities": A State's Version of "Equal Protection," 13
VT. L. REV. 221 (1988) (describing the hundreds of cases where state supreme courts found that their
state constitutions provide greater protections than those under the federal Constitution); Symposium:
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985) (discussing the emergence of
state constitutionalism).
244. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
245. Friedman, supra note 237, at 108 (quoting Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983) (Teague J., dissenting)): see also Friesen, supra note 205, at 1073 ("State supreme courts
have the power to interpret state law, including constitutional law, in any way they deem sound." (cit-
ing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969))).
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states or the U.S. Supreme Court when interpreting their own constitu-
tions. That they do, and have done so extensively since the 1800s, with-
out any apparent loss in legitimacy, undermines the force of the Sover-
eigntists' argument. Ironically, unlike on the international level, the
debate with state court decision making is not whether state courts can or
should refer to other state decisions. The debate is only whether state
courts in consulting those foreign sources may uncritically adopt other
state or federal interpretations of similar constitutional provisions. 46
There is a natural response to this comparison: states share a com-
mon history as part of a federalist system, and therefore interstate cita-
tion, or even borrowing, does not raise the same problem as the U.S. Su-
preme Court citing to foreign law. Admittedly, state constitutional
provisions are born and developed in a context that the national experi-
ence and the experience of sister states influences. But this is a differ-
ence of degree, not kind. On the one hand, states are not as similar as
one might think. State constitutions are distinctive "in their origins,"
"their legal premises," and "their history." 47 Likewise, "framers of the
state constitution[s] were different persons from the founding fathers,
writing under different circumstances."" As political scientist Alan Tarr
has detailed, "each state is a distinct polity, with its own fundamental
law.... "249  Accordingly, Alaska's constitutional history and tradition, 20
for instance, is remarkably different than Connecticut's constitutional
246. See Friedman, supra note 237, at 95 (describing three approaches to construing state consti-
tutional provisions; all of which permissibly look to federal and other state law for guidance). Com-
pare Friesen, supra note 205, at 1068-70 (arguing for state court to assert greater independence from
the federal judiciary when interpreting their own constitutions), and Randall T. Shepard, The Matur-
ing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (1996) (supporting independent
constructions of state constitutional provisions), with James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992) (arguing for greater deference to national constitution-
alism), and Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 EMERGING
ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 233, 235-38 (1989) (same), with Kahn, supra note 77, at 1159-60 (advocating a
middle-ground position that rejects the doctrine of unique state sources while freeing the state courts
"from the constitutionalism of the contemporary federal courts").
247. G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Interpretation, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 357, 357-59 (2004);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 365 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864) (explaining
that "[t]he federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes").
248. Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 641 (1994).
249. Tarr, supra note 247, at 364; see also Friesen, supra note 205, at 1074 (noting that "[sitate
declarations of individual rights have histories and qualities that differ, to a greater or lesser degree,
from each other and from the first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution").
250. Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the "Last Frontier," Professor Gardner: Alaska's Independent
Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1995) (describing Alaska's
unique constitutional background, how Alaska is "very different from the other forty-nine states," and
how the "Alaska constitution was purposefully 'customized' for the Alaskan experience"); see also
Thomas V. Van Flein, The Baker Doctrine and the New Federalism: Developing Independent Constitu-
tional Principles Under the Alaska Constitution, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 227, 228 (2004) (discussing the
sovereignty of the individual states and the ability of Alaskan courts to interpret Alaska's constitu-
tional provisions differently from similar ones in the U.S. Constitution).
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history,"1  which is different than Oregon's, 252 which is different from
Louisiana's. 3 If, as suggested in the debate over citing to foreign law, a
constitution is so peculiar to each locality, then surely state courts would
have nothing to learn from their sister states-but that has long been
found untrue.
On the other hand, the distinctions between the United States and
other countries are often overplayed.
The United States has never been a hermetically sealed legal sys-
tem. It shares a common legal heritage, tradition, and history with
many foreign constitutional systems. For that reason, constitutional
concepts like "liberty," "equal protection," "due process of law,"
and privacy have never been exclusive U.S. property, but have long
carried global meaning.254
Moreover, some countries, like Canada, "share a common law heritage
in private law in liberal democratic and federal structures of govern-
ment" and other historical, societal, and legal similarities that make their
laws particularly well suited to comparison.255 Other countries have long
borrowed from the U.S. system, and American constitutional precedents
have been emulated or adopted abroad, which is another reason why
foreign law is often not all that different. 6
In short, that state courts have a rich tradition of comparative con-
stitutionalism reveals that the debate over citing to foreign, law is a ques-
tion only of what weight to afford that law-the very debate that cor-
rectly ensues among the states.257  The real issue is not whether seeking
guidance from abroad is ever inappropriate, but whether in any particu-
lar case the foreign law is persuasive.
251. Michael F. J. Piecuch, State Constitutional Law in the Land of Steady Habits: Chief Justice
Ellen A. Peters and the Connecticut Supreme Court, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1757, 1177-79 (1997) (describing
the development of the Connecticut Constitution and noting the court's willingness to engage in inde-
pendent interpretation); see also Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 771-76 (Conn. 1995) (Peters, C.J.,
concurring) (discussing the early constitutional history of Connecticut).
252. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165
(1984); see also Louis H. Pollak, Judge-Professor Linde, 70 OR. L. REV. 679, 682 (1991) (describing
Judge Hans Linde's leadership in the state constitutional law movement as "one of the century's most
important judicial contributions").
253. Robert F. Williams, Shedding Tiers "Above and Beyond" the Federal Floor: Loving State
Constitutional Equality Rights to Death in Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 917, 918-20 (2003) (noting "the
rich and varied equality provisions contained in" the different state constitutions and discussing Lou-
isiana's equality provision that was added in 1974 and distinctly different from the federal equal pro-
tection clause).
254. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 47; see also Schauer, supra note 185, at 911-19 (ex-
plaining how even very old constitutions are not "entirely indigenous").
255. Harding, supra note 63, at 411 (explaining that "[a]s followers of the common law tradition,
[Canada and the U.S.) adhere to similar interpretations of the rule of law, follow similar procedural
and evidentiary rules, and believe strongly in the concept of stare decisis"); La Forest, supra note 62,
at 212-13 (noting that Canada and the U.S. share a "common law heritage in private law and in liberal
democratic and federal structures of government" that are "peculiar to North American legal and so-
cietal development").
256. Tripathi, supra note 156, at 329-42.
257. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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III. JUSTIFYING THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW
For all of the deficiencies in the Sovereigntist position, it is still in-
cumbent to explain why use of foreign law as persuasive authority is con-
sistent with American constitutionalism and the proper role of the judici-
ary. As shown below, one need not flirt with the idea of a universal,
natural law that so many find objectionable. One also need not suggest
that foreign law should be outcome-determinative, or not take seriously
"the particularist perspective on constitutional arrangements as manifes-
tations of key attributes of national identity. 258 Foreign law is persuasive
authority: nothing more, nothing less.259
A. Transparency and Judicial Dialogue
The U.S. Supreme Court should cautiously continue to cite to for-
eign law because an essential part of judging is citing to authority that the
justices use to arrive at their decisions. Our legal system is imbued with
the tradition that judges must justify their holdings.2 ° In doing so, they
must be candid and honest in revealing the sources, and stating the rea-
sons, for their decisions.261 Transparency is important.262 The public is
entitled to know why the Court ruled a particular way and to be provided
the opportunity to subject the reasoning to scrutiny.263 A decision that
accurately reveals the sources upon which it relies also furnishes greater
258. Jacobsohn, supra note 11, at 1767.
259. There are, admittedly, other uses for foreign law. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court
should be able to use, and has used, foreign law to explain the effects of a particular interpretation.
Larsen, supra note 37, at 1288-91, 1299 (describing a topology of foreign law uses including "exposi-
tory" and "empirical" approaches). In this situation, the Court is not using the foreign source to aid in
interpretation of a domestic constitutional provision. Certainly no objection can exist to using foreign
law to describe how the U.S. system is different, and therefore why a contrary result is warranted. Id.
at 1299.
260. Choudhry, supra note 64, at 824 (explaining that the Court is "under an obligation to engage
in a process of public justification for their own decisions"); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opin-
ions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 48 (2002) (explaining the "ju-
diciary's responsibility to communicate clearly with its various audiences as the essential ingredient in
achieving the goals of our judicial system"); cf Friedman et al., supra note 119, at 793-94 (describing
reasons for citation and their legitimizing function).
261. Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 721, 735-41 (1979) (arguing
for intellectual honesty and the need for judges to articulate the reasons for their decisions); see also
Scott Altman, Beyond Candor. 89 MIcH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1990) (arguing that judges should be can-
did, but not introspective); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731,
737-50 (1987) (arguing that honesty and candor in judicial decisions are essential attributes of the ju-
dicial process).
262. Dorsen, supra note 3, at 540 (quoting Justice Breyer as saying "[i]f the foreign materials have
had a significant impact on my thinking, they may belong in the opinion because an opinion should be
transparent. It should reflect my actual thinking."); see also Shapiro, supra note 261, at 736-38 (argu-
ing that transparency and candor is important in judicial opinions, so that the Court's analysis may be
subjected to rational scrutiny).
263. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365-72, 388
(1978) (noting "[b]y and large" that "fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by rea-
soned opinions" and arguing that reasoned response to reasoned argument is an essential component
of the judicial process).
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guidance for those who seek to discover from the decision what the next
case will likely hold.2' That judges must provide a candid and reasoned
explanation of the court's holding is a foundation of American jurispru-
dence and distinguishes our approach from that taken in countries like
France, "where judges typically employ an opinion form that is terse and
syllogistic. 265 As Justice Breyer explains: "[a justice's] opinion is meant
to reflect [the justice's] actual method of reaching a legal conclusion; and
references to those legal materials that had significance and will help the
reader understand. '266 Accordingly, if a justice used certain authority to
arrive at her decision, then the public has a right to know about it.
With this backdrop, citation to foreign law sources is inescapable.
Justices frequently read and use foreign law. 267 Judges may even use for-
eign law unconsciously.21 Judges from different nations commonly in-
teract on a personal level and at international judges' conferences.269
"Courts are talking to one another all over the world,' 27 ° and interna-
tional and foreign sources inevitably inform decisions.271 The only issue
is whether "judge[s] should disclose-and be ready to debate" their
views.272 And of course they should. If a judge has used foreign law, the
public has the right to know about it and question whether, given the
comparability of contexts and the judge's reasoning, the outcome is
sound. In short, judges must be willing to defend their decisions.
Remarkably, Justice Scalia and others suggest that judges should
read foreign legal materials as much as they want, but just not put the ci-
264. Leflar, supra note 261, at 737; see also Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42
UCLA L. REV. 651 (1995) (exploring, and ultimately criticizing, the "prediction model" whereby
lower courts would rule based on a prediction as to how the highest court would likely rule).
265. Wanderer, supra note 260, at 49 (citing Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opin-
ions, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (1994)).
266. Dorsen, supra note 3, at 541.
267. Jackson, supra note 55, at 119 ("It is almost impossible to be a well-informed judge or lawyer
now without having impressions of law and governance in countries other than one's own.").
268. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1238.
269. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 102, at 26 (describing the increased personal contact among
judges and noting that "[j]udges often discuss common problems at international judges' conferences,
by email, and over the telephone"); Slaughter, supra note 181, at 1120-23 (describing how judges from
constitutional courts from different nations began attending conference with one another and ex-
changing views about what their nations' constitutions said and meant).
270. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99,
100-18 (1994); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 158 (1991) (describing a "brisk international traffic in ideas about rights" carried on by
judges); Abrahamson & Fischer, supra note 142, at 287; Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment:
Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 555, 557-58 (2002); Slaughter, supra note 181, at 1103.
271. Jackson, supra note 55, at 119; see also Law, supra note 4, at 661 (describing how courts de-
velop generic constitutional theory, analysis, and doctrine in response to similar stimuli). For an ex-
ample of this interaction between the judiciaries of different nations, see JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 1-7 (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds.,
2004).
272. Jackson, supra note 55, at 119 n.52 (quoting Michael Kirby, Justice, High Court of Austl.,
Grotius Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: International
Law-The Impact on National Constitutions 40 (Mar. 29,2005)).
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tations in the opinions.273 This position-which appears to come close to
advocating deception in decision making-is undesirable.74 Promoting
opaque decisions is unattractive, not only as antithetical to our legal tra-
dition, but because it encourages judges to be arbitrary and manipulat-
ive.275  Indeed, the very concern that Sovereigntists rail against-
pragmatic, policy-based decisions-are likely to be increased if judges
use foreign materials silently. 76 Omitting key sources that inform a
judge's decision from the opinion insulates the basis of the decision from
debate and attack: vital means to constrain the judiciary's exercise of
power.277
The citation to foreign law is not only sensible for transparency rea-
sons, it also can serve to legitimize the Court as an institution, both
within the United States and around the world. Legitimacy "emanate[s]
from the persuasiveness of the arguments and the enhancement of com-
munal knowledge. 278 In some contexts, "foreign and international law
are actually necessary to legitimate decision-making. '279 Early on in our
nation's history, Americans "self-consciously" appealed to the views of
other nations "to win global legitimacy for their fledgling republic. ' ,21 In
others, foreign law legitimizes why our courts are doing something dif-
273. Dorsen, supra note 3, at 534 (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, "I mean, go ahead and indulge
your curiosity! Just don't put it in your opinions!").
274. Cf Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1964) (criticizing deception when judges
claim they are deciding a case for certain reasons, when in fact other reasons are decisive).
275. Altman, supra note 261, at 318-27 (arguing how introspection and hidden reasoning reduces
the law's constraints); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One
Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 904
(1987) (explaining that requiring judges to give reasons for their decisions provides a "profound con-
straint on judicial discretion").
276. Shapiro, supra note 261, at 737 (noting that "candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints
on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count
for little if judges feel free to believe one thing about them and to say another[]"); see also Paul Ge-
wirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 667 (1983) ("Candor and sincerity are part of the
distinctive process that legitimates judicial power-a process of decisionmaking and discourse whose
requirements include writing opinions and giving reasoned justifications. These constraints help to
promote the public accountability of judges and to stimulate judicial reflection and self-control, With-
out a requirement of candor, the constraints would be meaningless.").
277. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971) (arguing that "publicity"-full disclo-
sure of governing principles-is one of the essential formal constraints on the concept of right); see
also Shapiro, supra note 261, at 737 ("In the absence of an obligation of candor, this constraint [on the
judiciary's use of power] would be greatly diluted, since judges who regard themselves as free to dis-
tort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation
that honest disclosure of their motivation may entail.").
278. Harding, supra note 63, at 459; see also Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 540-54 (2002) (arguing that
use of foreign law is legitimate using Habermas' theory of general discourse).
279. Harding, supra note 63, at 459 (citing Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 97, at
262; McCrudden, supra note 66, at 523-25); see also Bryde, supra note 155, at 207 ("As already men-
tioned, compared to this hidden background influence, open references to foreign law are rare. When
they appear, they usually serve to provide additional legitimacy.").
280. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 47.
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ferent. 281 As Frank Michelman has described it, by comparative encoun-
ters, we "clarify our picture of ourselves.
282
Lastly, apart from issues of transparency and legitimacy in judicial
reasoning, the use of foreign materials is particularly appropriate if one
considers dialogical (as distinguished from particularist or universal)
methods of constitutional interpretation. Tellingly, despite a fair amount
of literature on the topic, those who condemn the use of foreign sources
generally ignore the dialogic models. 83
In recent years, theories of constitutional dialogue have emerged
"as one of the principal contenders in the quest for a satisfactory theory"
that legitimizes judicial review.2' Dialogical theories are based on "the
notion that judicial review is part of a 'dialogue' between the judges and
the legislatures." 85 Rather than focusing on interpretative criteria, dia-
logic models of interpretation focus on the "institutional process through
which decisions about constitutional meaning are made.
286
Dialogical models are particularly well suited to justify the use of
foreign law, a point generally well accepted. Indeed, the failure of the
U.S. Supreme Court to engage more vigorously in international dialogue
leaves the U.S. judiciary out-of-step and behind the times.287 A signifi-
cant amount of scholarship has emphasized the essential nature of this
dialogue and its benefits.288 "[C]ourts should be talking with each other
... and even with academics. All are engaged in a search for the mean-
ing of common concepts. The unique authority of each does not speak at
281. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that other
nations' "experience[s] may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solu-
tions to a common legal problem"); Jackson, supra note 55, at 117 (explaining how comparisons can
shed light on the "distinctive functioning of one's own system" and that engagement with foreign law
"need not lead to its adoption"); L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 102, at 26-27 (arguing that "[cross-
pollination helps not only when we accept the solutions and reasoning of others, but when we depart
from them, since even then, understanding and articulating the reasons a different solution is appro-
priate for a particular country helps make a better decision.").
282. Michelman, supra note 98, at 1758-59 (describing how comparative constitutionalism allows
us to understand our own unique culture and legal traditions better); see also Kahn, supra note 208, at
2679 (advocating a cultural approach to comparative constitutionalism that "can illuminate the differ-
ent constitutionalisms that already exist... [and miost importantly... help us to understand who we
are").
283. Alford, In Search of A Theory, supra note 9, at 639.
284. Bateup, supra note 189, at 1118.
285. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures:
(Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 79
(1997).
286. Bateup, supra note 189, at 1118.
287. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 102, at 37-40.
288. See, e.g., Choudhry, supra note 64, at 820 (discussing methods by which foreign courts use
comparative constitutional law); Harding, supra note 63, at 424-27 (describing foreign law and the
transnational dialogue); Michelman, supra note 98, at 1758-61 (describing a dialogical approach to
constitutional comparison); Waters, supra note 54, at 554-74; see also Carozza, supra note 66, at 1077-
89 (describing the global discourse over human rights law); Matthew S. Raalf, supra note 66, 1242-44.
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all to the common substance of their interpretative effort. '289 Melissa
Waters has captured the problem in a nutshell:
[T]his is not simply a debate over the relevance of foreign legal ma-
terials in the work of the U.S. courts. In a larger sense, it is a debate
over what role U.S. courts will play in the emerging transnational
judicial dialogue among the world's courts. Moreover, the outcome
of this debate will.., have a tremendous impact on the ability of
the Supreme Court and other U.S. courts to influence the emerging
transnational judicial dialogue, and through that dialogue, the de-




This article has attempted to show that the recent criticism of the
use of foreign law is much ado about nothing. It would be remiss, how-
ever, not to conclude by briefly describing how the use of foreign law
sources as persuasive authority is also sensible in several pragmatic re-
spects. First, an "enormous value [exists] in any discipline of trying to
learn from the similar experience of others. '29 1 Practical benefits exist to
having judges learn from "the technical competence of their fellow pro-
fessionals operating in an increasingly interconnected world system.
292
Foreign law can be a "source of good ideas" and provide "empirical evi-
dence about how a prospective legal rule operates in practice. 293 In-
deed, "considering and comparing judgments from various jurisdictions
makes for stronger, more considered decisions, even if the result is the
same."
294
This does not mean that the law of foreign nations should ever con-
trol our Constitution, but rather that foreign law informs and aids our
Court in its interpretation of our Constitution. 295  "No [nation's] experi-
ences are so different as to reject the norms of equality, liberty, and due
process" developed in other nations.296 The approach is pragmatic:
289. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1163.
290. Waters, supra note 38, at 160.
291. Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 3, at 266; Jacobsohn, supra note 11, at 1766 (describing
the "natural desire to learn from others in order to improve one's own circumstances" and the "logic
of self-improvement").
292. Kersch, supra note 9, at 354.
293. Bodansky, supra note 210, at 424-25.
294. L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 102, at 39; see also Abrahamson & Fisher, supra note 142, at
292 ("[E]ven when [the study of foreign experiences] does not immediately move us into a new stage
of thinking, it nearly always affords us a deeper understanding of, and a more balanced perspective on,
our own law." (quoting Professor Mary Ann Glendon)).
295. Vicki Jackson has appropriately described this as the Engagement Model. Jackson, supra
note 55, at 112.
296. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1162; see also Wald, supra note 8, at 441-42 ("[Citizens of most
countries have common aspirations, a sense of dignity and worth, and intuitions and feelings about
justice. Why then would we consciously shut the door to American judges on looking at the law of
these countries as it affects the basic human needs and dilemmas of their people?").
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[C]onstitutional law can be understood as a site of engagement be-
tween domestic law and international or foreign legal sources and
practices. On this view, the constitution's interpreters do not treat
foreign or international material as binding, or as presumptively to
be followed. But neither do they put on blinders that exclude for-
eign legal sources and experience.2 9
Or put simply by Justice Ginsburg, "[w]e are the losers if we do not both
share our experience with, and learn from others.
298
The use of foreign law furthers a second worthy goal. The use of
foreign law serves as a means for diplomatic harmonization on important
human rights issues. Judges "are beginning to articulate their responsi-
bility to 'help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather
than at cross purposes.' 299 As Professor Koh describes it:
[D]omestic courts must play a key role in coordinating U.S. domes-
tic constitutional values with rules of foreign and international law,
not simply to promote American aims, but to advance the broader
development of a well-functioning international judicial sys-
tem .... U.S. courts must look beyond narrow U.S. interests to the
'mutual interest of all nations in a smoothly functioning interna-
tional legal regime' and, whenever possible, should 'consider if
there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes, the develop-
ment of an ordered international system.3"°
Isolationism and parochialism undermine U.S. influence over the global
development of human rights.3"'
The "U.S. Supreme Court's failure to engage in the international
judicial dialogue may [also] cause other nations to be less willing to rely
on its rulings ... [and] reduce[s] its ability to shape the conversation
about legal norms.""32 Traditionally, the United States has had an un-
usual amount of influence on emerging democracies whose constitutional
courts would rely on U.S. Supreme Court precedent.3 3 But that influ-
ence is waning.3"4 Those courts are "increasingly looking to judicial deci-
sions from Europe, Australia, Africa, and Canada. ' '3'5 To the extent the
297. Jackson, supra note 55, at 114.
298. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 1.
299. Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New
Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 392 (1998) (quoting Howe v. Gold-
corp Invs. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991)); see also Kersch, supra note 9, at 354-55.
300. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 53-54 (citing Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Adro-
spatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 567 (1985) (Blackmun J., concurring in part)).
301. Id. at 56.
302. International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 67, at 2072; L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 102, at
27, 29-31, 38 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court is "less influential internationally than its predeces-
sors" in particular on human rights issues, in part because of its failure to engage with other nations'
courts and their laws).
303. See generally CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
304. Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537,
561 (1988); see also L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 102, at 37; Waters, supra note 54, at 493 n.26.
305. Waters, supra note 54, at 493.
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U.S. Supreme Court "refuses to consider the relevance of decisions from
other legal systems, this will eventually lead courts in other legal sys-
tems ... to view U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as irrelevant and iso-
lated."3" Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia goes a
step beyond. He has colorfully "gone so far as to warn that the United
States is in danger 'of becoming something of a legal backwater' if its
courts continue to disregard foreign precedent."3"
CONCLUSION
After several years of promising progression towards a meaningful
discourse on how to engage appropriately in comparative constitutional-
ism,3" recent years have been marred by a steady stream of academic
criticism and, at times, crass political condemnation of the Supreme
Court's use of foreign law. Let's hope that this criticism has seen its end,
because a continued backlash will undoubtedly have a chilling effect.
The arguments proffered to categorically bar the use of foreign law in all
circumstances are misplaced, at times have the whiff of xenophobia
about them, and are inconsistent with a long history of practice. The use
of foreign law as persuasive authority is deeply embedded in our legal
traditions, particularly in state court constitutionalism. Moreover, the
mere citation to foreign laws neither undermines our national sover-
eignty nor provides judges the means to render unprincipled, nakedly po-
litical decisions. When properly viewed, the condemnation of the
Court's use of foreign law is much ado about nothing: a storm in a tea-
cup.
Contrary to the thrust behind recent attacks on the judiciary, the
U.S. Supreme Court is sensible to cite cautiously to foreign law when it
informs the Court's decision. The United States is not so exceptional
that it has neither anything to say to, nor learn from, other nations.
More importantly, citing to persuasive authority-be it domestic or for-
eign -when that authority informs the Court's decision is an integral part
of what it means to be a justice when writing transparent, candid, and
reasoned opinions. One can only hope that we quickly move beyond the
parochial, and overly simplified, belief that foreign law should be cate-
gorically barred from constitutional adjudication. Instead of condemning
the Court for citing to foreign law, academic scholarship would be more
productively directed at educating the justices on how best to use and
engage with it. For, in the final analysis, the Supreme Court's use of for-
eign law is commendable, not illegitimate.
306. Harding, supra note 63, at 415; see also Barak, supra note 103, at 27 (suggesting that the in-
fluence of American law may be declining).
307. O'Scannlain, supra note 8, at 1897 (quoting Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG
2d 287, 291 (2001)).
308. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 48 (noting in January 2004 that "promising signs
have emerged that the American ostrich is finally starting to take its head out of the sand").
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